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BITCOIN FUTURES: FROM SELF-CERTIFICATION TO 
SYSTEMIC RISK 
LEE REINERS* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
December 2017 marked a milestone in the short history of virtual 
currency.  On Friday, December 1, 2017, the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change Inc. (“CME”) and the CBOE Futures Exchange (“CFE”) self-cer-
tified new contracts for cash-settled bitcoin futures products.1  The self-
certification process allows designated contract markets (“DCMs”) to list 
new derivative products one day after submitting in writing to the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) that the product complies 
with the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) and CFTC regulations.2  
Bitcoin first came under the CFTC’s remit in 2015, when the agency de-
termined, in an order against Coinflip, Inc., that bitcoin—and by exten-
sion all other virtual currencies—met the definition of a commodity un-
der the CEA.3  The CFTC has jurisdiction over commodity derivatives, 
but they do not oversee commodity “spot” or cash markets, except in 
 
*Lecturing Fellow and Executive Director of the Global Financial Markets Center at Duke 
University School of Law. The author would like to thank Ryan Clements for helpful com-
ments and edits.  
 1. Also, on December 1, 2017, the Cantor Exchange self-certified a new contract for 
bitcoin binary options.  This Article focuses exclusively on bitcoin futures contracts because 
they are more liquid, and more likely to be manipulated than binary options.  See U.S. 
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, CFTC BACKGROUNDER ON SELF-CERTIFIED 
CONTRACTS FOR BITCOIN PRODUCTS (2017), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/bitcoin_factsheet120117.pdf. 
 2. 17 C.F.R. § 40.2 (2018). 
 3. In re Coinflip, Inc., CFTC No. 15-29 (Sept. 17, 2015), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfcoin-
fliprorder09172015.pdf. 
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instances of fraud or manipulation.4  As a result, no federal agency super-
vises virtual currency exchanges in the U.S.5 
Prior to December 2017, there were limited options for U.S. in-
vestors that wanted access to bitcoin derivatives.  In 2014, TeraExchange, 
LLC, a Swap Execution Facility (“SEF”) registered with the CFTC, be-
gan listing bitcoin swaps for trading by “eligible contract participants.”6  
Also in 2014, North American Derivatives Exchange Inc., a DCM, listed 
binary bitcoin options that were available to retail investors.7  Then in 
July of 2017, the CFTC approved LedgerX’s application to become a SEF 
and a Derivatives Clearing Organization (“DCO”), thereby allowing 
LedgerX to offer physically-settled bitcoin put and call options and day-
ahead swaps to eligible contract participants.8 
Early bitcoin derivatives had limited appeal because they were 
illiquid, due in part to their bespoke features and the fact that they traded 
on venues that were relatively new and unknown, resulting in low trading 
volumes.  In addition, access to early bitcoin derivatives was primarily 
limited to wealthy investors.  When bitcoin futures launched, every in-
vestor now had access to a liquid product that traded on two of the world’s 
largest futures exchanges9 and that could be bought and sold through 
online retail brokers like E-Trade and TD Ameritrade.10  
The latent demand for bitcoin futures revealed itself when CFE 
launched their contract on December 10, 2017.  CFE was forced to halt 
 
 4. CFTC jurisdiction is also implicated when a commodity is offered for trading on a 
margined, leveraged, or financed basis.  See LABCFTC, A CFTC PRIMER ON VIRTUAL 
CURRENCIES 11 (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/pub-
lic/documents/file/labcftc_primercurrencies100417.pdf. 
 5. The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(“FinCEN”) does consider “administrators” and “exchangers” of convertible virtual curren-
cies to be money services businesses subject to regulations implementing the Bank Secrecy 
Act. See FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO 
PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (Mar. 18, 2013), 
https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-regulations/guidance/application-fincens-regula-
tions-persons-administering. 
 6. An “eligible contract participant” is a type of sophisticated trader, which includes 
various financial institutions and persons, with assets above specified statutory minimums.  
See 7 U.S.C § 1a(18)(A)(iv) (2012). 
 7. See LABCFTC, supra note 4, at 12. 
 8. See LABCFTC, supra note 4, at 12. 
 9. CME is the world’s largest futures exchange by volume and CBOE Holdings is the 
fourth largest.  See Largest Derivatives Exchanges Worldwide in 2017, by Number of Con-
tracts Traded (in Millions), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/272832/largest-in-
ternational-futures-exchanges-by-number-of-contracts-traded/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2018). 
 10. On their website, Cboe provides a list of brokers that offer trading in their futures 
contract. See CBOE, XBT-CBOE BITCOIN FUTURES, http://cfe.cboe.com/cfe-products/xbt-
cboe-bitcoin-futures (last visited Jan. 22, 2019). 
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trading two and a half hours after trading opened, when the futures price 
rose by 10% and tripped the exchange’s automatic circuit breaker.11  The 
first few days of futures trading saw the one-month contract trading for 
approximately $1,000 more than bitcoin’s spot price.12  This meant a risk-
free profit could be had by borrowing to buy one bitcoin while simulta-
neously selling a future; then in one month, you would sell the bitcoin 
and deliver the cash to settle the future.13  Whenever the futures price 
trades above the spot price for any asset, it typically indicates that there 
are costs associated with holding the underlying asset, but bitcoin is a 
digital asset that is theoretically costless to hold.14  
The introduction of CFE’s contract coincided with the largest 
one-week price increase (in dollar value) in bitcoin’s history, with the 
price rising from $15,168 on December 10, 2017, to an all-time high of 
$20,089 on December 17, 201715—the day CME launched their futures 
contract. Bitcoin euphoria came to an abrupt end post-CME contract 
launch, and by year-end 2017, bitcoin was trading at $14,156.16  Re-
searchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco have attributed 
this rapid decline in bitcoin’s price to the presence of speculators utilizing 
 
 11. Rob Urban et al., Bitcoin Futures Deliver Wild Ride as Debut Brings Rally, Halts, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-
10/bitcoin-futures-trading-opens-bringing-crypto-to-wall-street. 
 12. See, e.g., Matt Levine, Bitcoin Arbitrage and Tax Math, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 12, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-12-12/bitcoin-arbitrage-and-tax-math 
(discussing the arbitrage opportunities in the early days of bitcoin futures trading).  
 13. Your risk-free profit would be the price at which you sold the future minus the price 
you paid for the bitcoin plus any borrowing costs. See, e.g., Matt Levine, Bitcoin Futures and 
Banky Thoughts, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/arti-
cles/2017-12-11/bitcoin-futures-and-banky-thoughts (discussing how you would profit off 
the difference between bitcoin’s spot price and the future’s price). 
 14. For instance, oil futures often trade above the spot price for oil because it is costly to 
store oil. Because bitcoin is a digital asset that is theoretically costless to hold, the arbitrage 
opportunity must be due to other factors. The primary explanation is that investors want ex-
posure to bitcoin without having to acquire it and they are willing to pay a premium to own 
the futures contract (another contributing factor is that there are significant frictions in the 
market which prevent arbitrageurs from capturing the risk-free profit). Running a node on the 
bitcoin network requires a fairly high level of technological sophistication and the ability to 
keep your private key—a string of alphanumeric characters unique to each user—secure. 
Lacking such sophistication, many bitcoin holders chose to store their bitcoin in digital wallets 
or online exchanges, which are frequently hacked, resulting in the irrecoverable theft of cus-
tomer bitcoins.  See Levine, supra note 13.  
 15. All bitcoin price data in this Article comes from CoinMarkepCap. COINMARKETCAP, 
https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/bitcoin/historical-data/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2019). 
 16. Bitcoin would continue to decline throughout 2018, and ended the year trading at 
$3,742. Id. 
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bitcoin futures to bet against bitcoin.17  Prior to bitcoin futures, these pes-
simists “had no mechanism available to put money behind their belief 
that the bitcoin price would collapse.”18  Others have pushed back on the 
idea that bitcoin futures materially impact the price of bitcoin,19 noting 
the limited open interest in the contracts and the fact that the contracts are 
cash settled,20 meaning no actual bitcoins are exchanged. 
While it is difficult to know the precise impact cash-settled fu-
tures have on bitcoin’s price, it is clear from early experience that bitcoin 
futures serve primarily as a means to speculate on the price of bitcoin and 
not as a true hedging instrument.  This outcome was widely anticipated 
at the time bitcoin futures were launched, and led many market partici-
pants and observers to question why the CFTC allowed bitcoin futures to 
come to market.21  The CFTC responded by noting that Congress estab-
lished the self-certification process and they had limited grounds for halt-
ing a self-certification—none of which were met in the case of bitcoin 
futures.22  
This Article challenges the CFTC’s assertion that CME and CFE 
met all the requirements to self-certify bitcoin futures contracts.  CFTC 
regulation requires that any new contract not be readily susceptible to 
manipulation, but a careful review of the record indicates that bitcoin fu-
tures are susceptible to manipulation because the bitcoin spot market can 
 
 17. Galina Hale et al., How Futures Trading Changed Bitcoin Prices, FED. RES. BANK OF 
SAN FRANCISCO ECON. LETTER (May 7, 2018), https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/pub-
lications/economic-letter/2018/may/how-futures-trading-changed-bitcoin-prices/.  
 18. Id. 
 19. Chris Concannon, president and chief operating officer at Cboe Global Markets, Inc. 
said:  “While we are excited about our recently launched Bitcoin futures, the notion that they 
have materially affected the bitcoin price overstates their influence and ignores other critical 
facts. Our strict position limits and the limited open interest in our May and June settlements, 
suggest that the fall of Bitcoin can be more easily explained by other factors such as the recent 
regulatory scrutiny around the globe, steps by government tax collectors, the rise of other 
cryptocurrencies, and declining media interest in the asset.” Oscar Williams-Grut, Bitcoin 
Futures Could be Hurting Bitcoin’s Price, BUS. INSIDER AUSTL. (June 18, 2018), 
https://www.businessinsider.com.au/bitcoin-price-could-be-hit-by-bitcoin-futures-contracts-
says-tom-lee-2018-6. 
 20. See, e.g., Zhuoqi Gao, Using CBOE Bitcoin Futures to Predict Underlying Bitcoin 
Price Direction, SEEKING ALPHA (Mar. 25, 2018), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4158704-
using-cboe-bitcoin-futures-predict-underlying-bitcoin-price-direction. 
 21. See, e.g., Gabriel T. Rubin, Rise of Bitcoin Futures Prompts Regulator to Revisit 
Hands-Off Approach, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/rise-of-
bitcoin-futures-prompts-regulator-to-revisit-hands-off-approach-1517394600.  
 22. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, CFTC BACKGROUNDER ON OVERSIGHT OF 
AND APPROACH TO VIRTUAL CURRENCY FUTURES MARKETS 2 (Jan. 4, 2018), 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/%40customerprotection/docu-
ments/file/backgrounder_virtualcurrency01.pdf.  
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be manipulated.  In reviewing the contracts leading up to their self-certi-
fication, the CFTC ignored underlying dynamics in the bitcoin spot mar-
ket and chose to exclusively focus on the ability of the contracts them-
selves to be manipulated.  This Article casts doubt on the notion that a 
futures contract can be resistant to manipulation when the asset underly-
ing the contract is readily manipulated.  
In asserting this contention, the Article will proceed as follows.  
First, in Part II, it traces the evolution of the new product approval process 
for derivatives.23  It describes how common law considered derivatives 
to be speculation (and akin to gambling), and therefore prohibited legal 
enforceability of derivatives contracts.  This pushed derivatives specula-
tion onto private exchanges that enforced the contracts through a system 
of rules and requirements on exchange members.  Private exchanges were 
essentially free to determine their own rules until 1974, when amend-
ments to the CEA required the CFTC to approve all new exchange rules 
pertaining to the “terms and conditions in contracts of sale.”24  This af-
firmative process lasted until 2000, when the Commodity Futures Mod-
ernization Act (“CFMA”) effectively deregulated the derivatives market 
and instituted the self-certification regime, which gave exchanges much 
greater freedom to list new derivatives products.  Part II concludes by 
examining how the self-certification process was used to list bitcoin fu-
tures and the CFTC’s review of these products leading up to their self-
certification. 
Part III assesses the ability of bitcoin futures to comply with the 
CFTC’s Core Principle 3:25 “[t]he board of trade shall list on the contract 
market only contracts that are not readily susceptible to manipulation.”26  
Because bitcoin futures are cash-settled, they can be manipulated if the 
reference rate used to price the contracts at settlement can be manipu-
lated.  The price of bitcoin varies depending on the exchange it trades on, 
therefore, CME and CFE had to carefully construct a reference rate for 
their futures contracts that could not be manipulated.  CFE’s futures con-
tract relies on the Gemini Exchange’s daily bitcoin auction to determine 
the contract’s settlement value. However, Gemini lacks sufficient trading 
volume to facilitate price discovery and their daily auction often fails to 
clear a single bitcoin.  CME calculates a bitcoin reference rate based upon 
 
 23. See infra Part II. 
 24. PHILIP MCBIDE JOHNSON ET AL., DERIVATIVES REGULATION 497 (2018). 
 25. See infra Part III. 
 26. 17 C.F.R. § 38.200. 
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data provided by four “Constituent Exchanges.”  In their self-certification 
submission, CME noted two additional exchanges that are temporarily 
suspended from submitting pricing data—OkCoin and Bitfinex.  The 
mention of these two exchanges should have been a red flag for the 
CFTC, as they both have a troubled history, especially Bitfinex, which 
has been accused of propping up the entire bitcoin spot market throughout 
much of 2017.27  Not only did the CFTC fail to find fault with either 
reference rate, they also chose to ignore clear evidence of fraud and ma-
nipulation in the bitcoin spot market.  The Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (“SEC”) took a different approach when reviewing a proposal for 
a bitcoin exchange-traded product and concluded that manipulation in the 
bitcoin spot market precluded any kind of exchange-traded product tied 
to bitcoin.28 
Part IV assesses the impact of bitcoin futures on systemic risk.  
While the virtual currency market at present is not large enough to 
threaten financial stability, the introduction of bitcoin futures creates new 
interconnections within the financial system that could one day propagate 
systemic risk should the market continue to grow.  Bitcoin futures pierced 
the previous barrier that had largely separated the virtual currency market 
from the regulated financial system.  Now, large Wall Street firms offer 
their clients access to bitcoin futures, which trade on regulated exchanges 
and are cleared on systemically important clearinghouses.  In addition, 
these parties may not fully understand the risks they are taking on due to 
bitcoin’s novelty and complexity.  The financial crisis of 2008 serves as 
a stark reminder of what can happen when seemingly sophisticated finan-
cial institutions trade complex derivatives. 
Part V concludes by assessing the role of bitcoin futures in inte-
grating the virtual currency market with the broader financial system and 
highlights several proposals for amending the new product approval pro-
cess. 
 
 27. See, e.g., John M. Griffin & Amin Shams, Is Bitcoin Really Un-Tethered? (June 13, 
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3195066 (discussing Bitfinex’s 
use of Tether to support the price of bitcoin).  
 28. See Order Disapproving a Proposed Rule Change to BZX Rule 14.11(e)(4), Exchange 
Act Release No. 34-80206, 116 S.E.C. Dockets 2746 (Mar. 10, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/batsbzx/2017/34-80206.pdf, at 2 [hereinafter SEC Disapproval 
Order]. 
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II.  NEW PRODUCT APPROVAL PROCESS 
A.       Historical Overview of U.S. Futures Regulation 
In 1974, Congress passed the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission Act, which overhauled the Commodity Exchange Act and estab-
lished the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, granting the CFTC 
exclusive jurisdiction over futures trading in all commodities.29 The CEA 
was designed to:  
 
[d]eter and prevent price manipulation or any other dis-
ruptions to market integrity; to ensure the financial integ-
rity of all transactions subject to this chapter and the 
avoidance of systemic risk; to protect all market partici-
pants from fraudulent or other abusive sales practices and 
misuses of customer assets; and to promote responsible 
innovation and fair competition among boards of trade, 
other markets and market participants.30  
 
The federal government has focused on preventing fraud and ma-
nipulation in commodity futures markets since futures trading first came 
under federal oversight in 1921 with the passage of The Futures Trading 
Act.31  Concerns around fraud and manipulation are grounded in the com-
mon law, which differentiates between futures contracts entered into for 
hedging purposes and those used for speculation (referred to in the com-
mon law as “difference contracts”).32  To differentiate between the two, 
 
 29. The CFTC’s predecessor, the Commodity Exchange Authority, only regulated agri-
cultural commodities enumerated in the Commodity Exchange Act. See CFTC, U.S. FUTURES 
TRADING AND REGULATION BEFORE THE CREATION OF THE CFTC, https://cftc.gov/About/His-
toryoftheCFTC/history_precftc.html (providing a history of commodity derivatives regula-
tion). 
 30. 7 U.S.C. § 5(b) (2012). 
 31. The Futures Trading Act was found unconstitutional and replaced by the Grain Fu-
tures Act in 1922. See CFTC, supra note 29. 
 32. See, e.g., State v. Stripling, 113 Ala. 120, 123–24 (1896) (dictum) (stating that dif-
ference contracts have been “the source of great injury to morals”); Cunningham v. Nat’l 
Bank, 71 Ga. 400, 403–05 (1882) (stating that difference contracts are “fraught with . . . evil 
consequences” and are hence contrary to public policy); Rumsey v. Berry, 65 Me. 570, 574 
(1876) (dictum) (emphasizing that difference contracts are “against public policy, and not 
only void, but deserving of the severest censure”); Cassard v. Hinmann, 14 How. Pr. 84, 90–
91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1856) (invalidating a difference contract under a law prohibiting betting 
and gaming for fear that speculative contracts would become “as common as legitimate deal-
ing”); Brua’s Appeal, 55 Pa. 294, 298–99 (1867) (holding invalid promissory notes for debts 
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courts looked to the intent of the transaction—if one of the contracting 
parties owned or expected to own (“take delivery of”) the underlying 
physical asset or commodity, then the contract was deemed to be entered 
into for hedging purposes and was therefore legally enforceable.33  On 
the other hand, a futures contract entered into for speculative purposes—
meaning neither party owned or expected to own the underlying com-
modity—was deemed void and legally unenforceable.34 
The courts recognized that futures speculation created incentives 
for contracting parties to manipulate the price of the underlying assets. In 
addition, courts considered derivatives speculation to be nothing more 
than rent-seeking behavior that wasted valuable human capital and in-
creased aggregate risk.  In this sense, derivatives speculation was thought 
of as a form of gambling that created unnecessary risks, not only for the 
contracting parties, but also for society as a whole. Such risks included: 
“bankruptcies, defalcations of public officers, embezzlements, forgeries, 
[and] larcenies.”35 
Because the common law prohibited legal enforceability of spec-
ulative derivatives contracts, a system of “private ordering” emerged that 
allowed derivatives speculators to enforce their contracts by trading them 
on private venues.36  These private trading venues became the first com-
modity exchanges.  Initially dominated by those with an economic inter-
est in hedging a given commodity’s price (farmers, merchants, millers), 
futures exchanges quickly became the domain of professional specula-
tors, who were aided in their endeavors by the telegraph, which allowed 
them to easily place bets on future commodity price movements at venues 
across the country.37 
While not enforceable by the courts, speculative futures contracts 
were enforced by the exchanges through the requirement that exchange 
members guarantee the performance of all exchange contracts.  The ex-
changes ensured their members could uphold this guarantee by closely 
monitoring them and enforcing membership requirements such as 
 
owed on a speculative contract on the grounds that “[a]ll gambling is immoral” and leads to 
misery and suffering). 
 33. See Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 11 (2011).  
 34. Id.  
 35. Cunningham v. Nat’l Bank of Augusta, 71 Ga. 400, 403 (1882). 
 36. See Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering 
in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L. J. 701 (1999). 
 37. Stout, supra note 33, at 15.  
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collateral, capital, and standardized contract terms.  These early futures 
exchanges have been characterized as “private gambling clubs owned by 
sophisticated business parties with both the motive and the means to en-
sure that members in the club would make good on their bets.”38  
Federal regulation of futures trading went through several itera-
tions between the early 1920s and the establishment of the CFTC in 
1974.39  In addition to authorizing the CFTC to regulate private commod-
ity exchanges, the CEA also codified and hardened previous common law 
rules by strictly prohibiting trading in “off-exchange futures” (or “OTC 
derivatives”).40  This requirement meant that not only were off-exchange 
futures judicially unenforceable, but they were now illegal as well.41 
 B.        New Product Approval Pre-CFMA 
Futures exchanges establish rules that govern the terms and con-
ditions of all futures contracts and the rights and duties of exchange mem-
bers.  Prior to 1936, exchanges were free to determine their own rules 
without government interference.42  Upon passage of the CEA in 1936, 
all exchange contract rules, and changes to existing rules, had to be sub-
mitted to the Commodity Exchange Commission (the “Commission”), 
which consisted of the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Com-
merce, and the Attorney General.  Although exchanges were required to 
submit rule changes to the government, the government did not have a 
right to disapprove of these rules, provided certain conditions were met.43  
With amendments to the CEA in 1968, the Secretary of Agriculture was 
given the authority to disapprove rules containing “terms and conditions 
in contracts of sale to be executed on or subject to the rules of such con-
tract market or relate to other trading requirements.”44  Philip McBride 
Johnson and Thomas Lee Hazen note that the legislative history of these 
 
 38. Stout, supra note 33, at 16. 
 39. See CFTC, supra note 29 (discussing the history of U.S. futures trading and regula-
tion). 
 40. There were exceptions to this prohibition for OTC “forward” contracts that were 
physically settled and presumed to serve a hedging purpose. See Stout, supra note 33, at 18.  
 41. Stout, supra note 33, at 18. 
 42. JOHNSON, ET AL., supra note 24, at 496. 
 43. For instance, the Grain Futures Act of 1922 required the contract markets to “pro-
vide” against manipulations, comers, false rumors, and denial of membership to qualified ag-
ricultural cooperatives, all of which was done through the adoption of rules. JOHNSON, ET AL., 
supra note 24, at 496. 
 44. JOHNSON, ET AL., supra note 24, at 497. 
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CEA amendments “suggests that this limiting language was incorporated 
for the purpose of distinguishing between market oriented rules and the 
many other rules adopted by exchanges to govern their internal, adminis-
trative, operational, or political life.”45  Thus, it appears that Congress’s 
intent was to give the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to review, 
and if necessary, disapprove, rules related to contract terms and condi-
tions and not the administrative rules governing exchange member be-
havior.46  
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 trans-
formed the new product approval regimen, amending the previous pro-
cess (whereby a new contract could be disapproved of) to an affirmative 
process, whereby the CFTC had to approve new rules pertaining to the 
“terms and conditions in contracts of sale.”47  The amended CEA required 
the CFTC to process rule change requests within 180 days of submission 
and to approve proposed rules if they did not violate the CEA or the Com-
mission’s regulations.48  This process remained essentially unchanged 
until passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (“CFMA”) 
in 2000.49  Thus, from 1968 until 2000, the CFTC had the right to review, 
and disapprove of, contract market rules relating to “terms and conditions 
of sale.”50 The CFTC did not define “terms and conditions of sale” until 
it adopted former Regulation section 1.41 in 1983.51  In that regulation, 
the CFTC defined “terms and conditions” as “any definition of the trading 
unit or the specific commodity underlying a contract for the future deliv-
ery of a commodity or commodity option contract, specification of set-
tlement or delivery standards and procedures, and establishment of buy-
ers’ and sellers’ rights and obligations under the contract.”52  Therefore, 
during the period of time when the CFTC reviewed proposed rule 
changes, rules that were operational or administrative in nature were 
 
 45. JOHNSON, ET AL., supra note 24, at 497. 
 46. Johnson and Hazen note that rules related to contract margin levels were excluded 
from review. JOHNSON, ET AL., supra note 24, at 498. 
 47. JOHNSON, ET AL., supra note 24, at 498 (both 1968 and 1974 amendments only applied 
to terms and conditions of contracts and not margin requirements or other rules governing 
member behavior). 
 48. The Act also required the CFTC to give notice of disapproval to the contract market 
and provide an opportunity for a hearing.  JOHNSON, ET AL., supra note 24, at 498. 
 49. Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000, 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
 50. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 500. 
 51. Contract Market Rule Review Procedures, 48 Fed. Reg. 49,003 (Oct. 24, 1983) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 52. 48 Fed. Reg. 49,008 (Oct. 24, 1983) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 1.41(a)(2) (1984)). 
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largely excluded from such review, including rules pertaining to margin 
levels.53 
C.         The CFMA’s Impact on New Product Approval 
The CFMA upended the previous system of new product ap-
proval by eliminating the pre-approval requirement and introducing a 
self-certification process that allows exchanges to place new rules into 
effect, including rules applicable to the terms and conditions of new con-
tracts, almost immediately, provided the proposed rule adheres to CEA 
and CFTC regulations. 
Self-certification allows designated contract markets54 (“DCMs”) 
to list any new contract for trading, and approve any new rule or amend-
ment, by providing a written certification to the CFTC that the new con-
tract, rule, or rule amendment, complies with the CEA and CFTC regula-
tions.55  Unless the CFTC finds the new product or rule change violates 
the CEA or CFTC regulations, the DCM may list the new product no 
sooner than one full business day following the self-certification.  DCMs 
also have the option of voluntarily submitting new contracts for approval 
to the Commission. 
The CFTC has established twenty-three core principles that must 
be met in order for an exchange to list a new contract.  The core principles 
run the gamut from requiring exchanges to prevent manipulation in traded 
contracts to enforcing rules governing exchange member conduct.  The 
CFTC has limited grounds for staying a new contract listing and may only 
do so when there are “novel or complex issues that require additional time 
to analyze, an inadequate explanation by the submitting registered entity, 
or a potential inconsistency” with the CEA or CFTC regulation.56 
As shown in Figure 1, exchanges were initially hesitant to take 
advantage of self-certification.  In 2000, nearly the same number of new 
products were launched by submitting them to the CFTC for approval 
(twenty-three) as were launched by self-certification (twenty-four).  It 
wasn’t until 2002 that exchanges began to make liberal use of the self-
 
 53. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 503.  
 54. Designated contract markets (DCMs) are exchanges that may list for trading futures 
or option contracts based on all types of commodities and that may allow access to their fa-
cilities by all types of traders, including retail customers. See Trading Organizations, CFTC, 
https://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/TradingOrganizations/index.htm.  
 55. 7 U.S.C. § 7(a)(2). 
 56. Id. 
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certification process, and the use of self-certification has continued to 
grow to the point where now, new contracts are introduced exclusively 
through self-certification.  
 
Figure 157 
 
 
D.         The CFMA’s Legacy  
The CFMA is commonly cited as a primary cause of the Global 
Financial Crisis (the “crisis”).58  This criticism has focused on the 
CFMA’s liberalization of the OTC derivatives market, which included 
overturning the prohibition on OTC derivatives, which had been in place 
since 1974.  After the CFMA’s passage, the OTC derivatives market 
 
 57. The data in Figure 1 is compiled from a publicly available database on the CFTC’s 
website. Trading Organization Products, CFTC, 
https://sirt.cftc.gov/sirt/sirt.aspx?Topic=TradingOrganizationProducts&implicit=true&Sta-
tus=Certified&CustomColumnDisplay=TTTTTTTTT. 
 58. See Stout, supra note 33 at 22–27; FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE 
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 48 (2011) 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. 
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quickly grew to the point where it posed a systemic risk.59  When U.S. 
home prices began to decline in 2006, the OTC derivatives market served 
as a channel by which this systemic risk spread to all corners of the fi-
nancial system.  While the scholarly literature has focused on the 
CFMA’s role in deregulating OTC derivatives, little attention has been 
placed on how the legislation upended the new product approval process 
for commodity derivatives.60  
It is clear from Figure 1 that the self-certification process facili-
tated the launch of many new kinds of exchange-traded commodity de-
rivatives.  These contracts may have been less risky than off-exchange 
(OTC) derivatives, but this does not mean that they were well-understood 
by those who traded them.  Therefore, by allowing a flood of new ex-
change-traded derivatives to enter the market in the run-up to the crisis, 
the self-certification process played a role in fostering financial instabil-
ity.61 
While post-crisis reforms in the U.S. and other developed coun-
tries have reduced the risks associated with OTC derivatives by mandat-
ing central clearing and post-trade transparency, the self-certification pro-
cess remains in place. 
E.         The CFTC’s Heightened Review of Bitcoin Futures  
The introduction of bitcoin futures brought fresh attention to the 
self-certification process, which had largely avoided academic and press 
scrutiny.  Many market observers and commenters were surprised to learn 
that futures contracts on a new and unique asset like bitcoin could be 
brought to market with no public input and limited regulatory review.  To 
provide more clarity on the self-certification process and federal over-
sight over virtual currency, the CFTC took the unusual step on January 4, 
2018, of releasing a background document titled:  “CFTC Backgrounder 
on Oversight of and Approach to Virtual Currency Futures Markets” (the 
“backgrounder”).62 
 
 59. At year-end 2000, when the CFMA was passed, the notional amount of OTC deriva-
tives outstanding globally was $95.2 trillion, and the gross market value was $3.2 trillion. In 
the seven and one-half years from then until June 2008, when the market peaked, outstanding 
OTC derivatives increased more than sevenfold to a notional amount of $672.6 trillion; their 
gross market value was $20.3 trillion. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 58, at 48. 
 60. For a better understanding of how the CFMA transformed the new product approval 
process, see Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial 
Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63 (2012). 
 61. The precise role the self-certification process played in contributing to the crisis is 
not known, but it is a question worthy of scholarly analysis. 
 62. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, CFTC BACKGROUNDER ON OVERSIGHT OF 
AND APPROACH TO VIRTUAL CURRENCY FUTURES MARKETS (Jan. 4, 2018), 
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The CFTC acknowledged in the backgrounder that they have lim-
ited grounds to “stay” a self-certification and that in the case of CME’s 
and CFE’s self-certification of bitcoin futures contracts, these grounds 
were not met.  The CFTC went on to defend their actions by stating: 
“[h]ad it even been possible, blocking self-certification would not have 
stemmed interest in Bitcoin or other virtual currencies nor their spectac-
ular and volatile valuations.  Instead, it would have ensured that the vir-
tual currency spot markets continue to operate without federal regulatory 
surveillance for fraud and manipulation.”63 
The CFTC also acknowledged that they engaged with both ex-
changes in the period leading up to the self-certifications in a process they 
refer to as “heightened review.”64  Heightened review is a new process, 
without statutory basis, that the CFTC is using to review new virtual cur-
rency derivatives products.  There is no mention of heightened review in 
CFTC documents or staff statements prior to release of the backgrounder, 
thus, heightened review appears to be a label the CFTC attached after-
the-fact to the process utilized with CME and CFE prior to the launch of 
their bitcoin futures contracts.  The backgrounder lists seven specific el-
ements to heightened review:    
 
1. Derivatives clearing organizations (“DCOs”) setting 
substantially high initial and maintenance margin for 
cash-settled bitcoin futures;   
2. DCMs setting large trader reporting thresholds at five 
bitcoins or less;   
3. DCMs entering direct or indirect information sharing 
agreements with spot market platforms to allow ac-
cess to trade and trader data;   
4. DCMs monitoring data from cash markets with re-
spect to price settlements and other bitcoin prices 
more broadly, and identifying anomalies and dispro-
portionate moves in the cash markets compare to the 
futures markets; 
5. DCMs agreeing to engage in inquiries, including at 
the trade settlement level when necessary; 
6. DCMs agreeing to regular coordination with CFTC 
surveillance staff on trade activities, including 
 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/back-
grounder_virtualcurrency01.pdf. 
 63. Id. at 2. 
 64. Id. at 3. 
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providing the CFTC surveillance team with trade set-
tlement data upon request; and   
7. DCMs coordinating product launches so that the 
CFTC’s market surveillance branch can carefully 
monitor minute-by-minute developments.65   
 
It is clear from the backgrounder and other public statements 
made by CFTC leadership, 66 that the CFTC viewed the introduction of 
bitcoin futures contracts as a positive development.  The primary benefit, 
according to the CFTC, is that by requiring CME and CFE to enter into 
information sharing agreements with bitcoin spot market platforms and 
share their market insights with the CFTC, the CFTC will have greater 
visibility into the bitcoin spot market, which they do have the authority 
to police for fraud and manipulation.  However, bitcoin spot trading is 
diffuse, and the exchanges that are sharing information with CME and 
CFE represent a small portion of overall bitcoin spot trading.67  There-
fore, the CFTC’s visibility into bitcoin spot markets remains limited, and 
the introduction of bitcoin futures contracts may incentivize manipulative 
behavior in a spot market that is already ripe with manipulation. 
III.  MANIPULATION IN THE BITCOIN MARKET 
A.        Bitcoin Violates the Law of One Price 
The key regulatory hurdle CME and CFE needed to clear in list-
ing their respective bitcoin futures contracts was the CFTC’s Core Prin-
ciple 3:  “[t]he board of trade shall list on the contract market only con-
tracts that are not readily susceptible to manipulation.”68  The ability to 
manipulate a cash-settled futures contract depends on how easily the ref-
erence rate that is used to price the contract can also be manipulated.  For 
instance, a trader seeking to profit off a long position in a bitcoin futures 
contract could place a large trade in the bitcoin spot market on the con-
tract’s settlement date, thereby pushing up the price of bitcoin and earning 
a tidy profit on the futures position.69  This tactic, known as “banging the 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. See J. Christopher Giancarlo, Remarks to the ABA Derivatives and Futures Section 
Conference, Naples, Florida (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesT-
estimony/opagiancarlo34. 
 67. These points will be made more explicit later in the Article. 
 68. 17 C.F.R. § 38.200. 
 69. See, e.g., Alexander Osipovich, Bitcoin Futures Manipulation 101: How ‘Banging 
the Close’ Works, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 16, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoin-futures-
manipulation-101-how-banging-the-close-works-1513425600. 
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close,” has a long history in futures markets70 and has played a central 
role in several recent high-profile market manipulation scandals.71 
Establishing the reference rate for most cash-settled futures con-
tracts is relatively straightforward; the value of an S&P 500 futures con-
tract is simply determined by the level of the S&P 500 index.  However, 
determining the reference rate for bitcoin futures is challenging because 
bitcoin violates the “law of one price” —an economic principle wherein 
the price of an identical security or commodity should have the same 
price regardless of where it is traded.  If you were to look up the price of 
bitcoin on five different exchanges, you would likely see five different 
prices.  According to this law, price discrepancies should be eliminated 
by arbitrageurs buying bitcoin on the lowest priced exchange and selling 
it on the highest.  In 2016, researchers from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York looked into why bitcoin violates the law of one price and came 
up with several answers.72  One partial explanation is that bitcoin ex-
changes charge high trading fees, and sometimes fees for depositing or 
withdrawing fiat currency, and these fees eat into arbitrage profits.  The 
researchers also found that on certain exchanges, it took five to ten days 
to deposit U.S. dollars into a user’s account; should a trader seek to ex-
ploit an arbitrage opportunity by trading on an online exchange, they may 
not be able to execute their trade before the price of bitcoin moves against 
them.73  To avoid this risk, traders can pre-fund their bitcoin exchange 
accounts, but this exposes them to the risk that the exchanges may be 
hacked and their funds stolen. 
Because bitcoin lacks a universal price, CME and CFE needed to 
develop a reference rate for bitcoin futures that was resistant to manipu-
lation.  In their self-certifications, both exchanges spent a considerable 
amount of time explaining the construction and features of their reference 
rate and why they believe it cannot be manipulated.74 
 
 70. See, e.g., Craig Pirrong, Manipulation of Cash-Settled Futures Contracts, 74 J. BUS. 
221 (2001). 
 71. This includes the foreign exchange market and LIBOR.  
 72. Alexander Kroeger & Asani Sarkar, Is Bitcoin Really Frictionless?, LIBERTY ST. 
ECON. (March 23, 2016), http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2016/03/is-bitcoin-
really-frictionless.html. 
 73. The researchers also found delays in the time it took to move bitcoin between various 
exchanges. Id. 
 74. See Certification Letter from Christopher Bowen, Managing Director & Chief Reg. 
Couns., Chicago Exchange, Inc., to Christopher J. Kirkpatrick, CFTC Secretary, 5 (Dec. 1, 
2017), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/filings/ptc/17/12/ptc120117cmedcm001.pdf; 
Product Certification Letter from Cboe to Christopher J. Kirkpatrick, CFTC Secretary 2 (Dec. 
1, 2017), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/filings/ptc/17/12/ptc120117cfedcm001.pdf. 
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B.         CME Reference Rate Constituent Exchanges 
The CME bitcoin futures contract utilizes the Bitcoin Reference 
Rate (“BRR”) as the unit of trade. The BRR is administered by Crypto 
Facilities Ltd. (“CF”) 75  and is governed by an oversight committee (the 
“Committee”). According to Crypto Facilities, “[t]he role of the Over-
sight Committee is to provide an oversight function to review and provide 
challenge on all aspects of the methodology and calculation process and 
provide effective oversight of CF as the administrator of the Cryptocur-
rency Pricing Products.”76  CME has significant influence over the Com-
mittee because they hold two of the seven seats, including the chairman-
ship.  The remaining Committee members include one representative 
from Crypto Facilities and four independent bitcoin experts.77  Any mem-
ber of the Committee may be removed, with or without cause, jointly by 
CF and CME.78  
As of October 11, 2018, the BRR is calculated based upon bitcoin 
transactions in U.S. dollars on four different exchanges: Bitstamp, 
GDAX, Itbit and Kraken (the “Constituent Exchanges”).  In their certifi-
cation, CME lists seven criteria that must be met for an exchange to be-
come a BRR Constituent Exchange.79  This includes a requirement that 
each exchange must account for at least 3% of total bitcoin versus U.S. 
dollar spot trading volume occurring on all Constituent Exchanges com-
bined during each of the last two consecutive calendar quarters.80  
 
 75. Crypto Facilities was purchased by virtual currency exchange Kraken on February 4, 
2019.  Crypto Facilities will remain London-based and be subject to oversight by the United 
Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority.  Press Release from Crypto Facilities, Kraken Ac-
quires Crypto Derivatives Trading Platform and Index Provider, Crypto Facilities, in Nine-
figure deal, (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.cryptofacilities.com/cryptocurrency-news/crypto-fa-
cilities-acquired-by-kraken.  
 76. CRYPTO FACILITIES LTD., CME CF CRYPTOCURRENCY PRICING PRODUCTS OVERSIGHT 
COMMITTEE (June 7, 2018), https://www.cryptofacilities.com/cms/storage/re-
sources/phpeqL79X.pdf. 
 77. In their self-certification CME states that the Committee meets once per quarter but 
the meeting minutes posted to CME’s and CF’s websites indicate that the first meeting in 
2018 didn’t occur until July. In 2017, the Committee did meet on a quarterly basis. See 
CRYPTO FACILITIES LTD., https://www.cryptofacilities.com/indices/XBT/USD/RR/days (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2019) (the site contains a list of all previous meeting minutes). 
 78. CRYPTO FACILITIES LTD., supra note 76. 
 79. Bowen, supra note 74.  
 80. The 3% volume criterion is not listed in the Committee’s “Constituent Exchange Cri-
teria” document but a representative from Crypto Facilities assured me via email that the 
minimum required volume contribution for any exchange to become eligible for potential 
inclusion is 3% of the combined total of all the existing exchanges and this information will 
be reflected in the next update to the “Constituent Exchange Criteria” document, which as of 
January 11, 2019, has yet to occur. See CRYPTO FACILITIES LTD., CME CF CRYPTOCURRENCY 
PRICING PRODUCTS: CONSTITUENT EXCHANGES CRITERIA (May 2018), https://www.cryptofa-
cilities.com/cms/storage/resources/phpPo5sVo.pdf.  
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In their certification, CME notes two additional Constituent Ex-
changes, Bitfinex and OkCoin, are temporarily suspended from contrib-
uting to the BRR due to “fiat transfer restrictions.”81  The Committee 
minutes from the September 2017 meeting indicate Bitfinex and OkCoin 
were “removed from the BRR in April 2017 due to transfer restrictions” 
which “currently persist.”82  While neither CME’s certification, nor the 
Committee minutes, elaborate on what is meant by “transfer restrictions,” 
there are numerous news articles from April 2017 that detail the difficulty 
Bitfinex and OKCoin customers were having in moving fiat currency 
into, and out of, their exchange accounts.  In April 2017, Bitfinex released 
the following statement: “Beginning April 18, 2017, all incoming wires 
to Bitfinex will be blocked and refused by our Taiwan banks. This applies 
to all fiat currencies at the present time.  Accordingly, we ask customers 
to avoid sending incoming wires to us until further notice, effective im-
mediately.”83  OKCoin experienced a similar issue around the same time 
with their Taiwan-based intermediary banks.84  
Bitfinex and OKCoin are two of the four largest bitcoin ex-
changes by dollar trading volume;85 therefore, including both exchanges 
in the calculation of the BRR would help foster price discovery.  How-
ever, there is no mention of either exchange in the December 2017 or July 
2018 Committee minutes, so we can only speculate as to why they remain 
suspended from contributing to the BRR.  While Bitfinex customers con-
tinue to experience delays with fiat currency withdrawals,86 OKCoin ap-
pears to have cleared up their transfer restriction issues.  
Beyond the transfer restrictions, both exchanges have experi-
enced serious problems that have generated negative press coverage, 
much of which was publicly known when CME submitted their certifica-
tion.  Bitfinex has an especially troubled past. In 2016, hackers stole $72 
 
 81. Bowen, supra note 74.  
 82. CRYPTO FACILITIES LTD., CME CF OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE MINUTES SEP 2017 (Sept. 
7, 2017), https://www.cryptofacilities.com/cms/storage/resources/phpnmQarW.pdf. 
 83. Andrew Saks-McLeod, Instability at Bitfinex Reinforces FinaneFeeds View that 
Bitcoin Will Never be a Financial Mainstay, FINANCEFEEDS (April 18, 2017), https://fi-
nancefeeds.com/instability-bitfinex-reinforces-financefeeds-view-bitcoin-will-never-finan-
cial-mainstay/. 
 84. See Samburaj Das, After Bitfinex, Chinese Bitcoin Exchange OKCoin Suspends Wire 
Transfers, CCN (April 19, 2017), https://www.ccn.com/bitcoin-exchange-okcoin-suspends-
wires/. 
 85. Obtaining accurate data on bitcoin trading volume is difficult. My main source for 
trading volume data is www.data.bitcoinity.org but for whatever reason they do not list vol-
ume data for OKCoin or its subsidiary, OKEx. OKEx trading volume can be found at: Top 
100 Cryptocurrency Exchanges by Trade Volume, COINMARKETCAP  https://coinmar-
ketcap.com/rankings/exchanges/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2018). 
 86. See David Floyd & Nikhilesh De, For Bitfinex Users, Dollar Withdrawals Are Now 
a Weeks-Long Struggle, COINDESK (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/for-bitfinex-
users-dollar-withdrawals-are-now-a-weeks-long-struggle/. 
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million worth of bitcoin from Bitfinex,87 just fifteen months after a dif-
ferent hack resulted in the theft of 1,500 bitcoins from the exchange.88  
Bitfinex has also run afoul of applicable U.S. regulation.  In 2016, the 
CFTC reached a settlement with Bitfinex over their practice of letting 
U.S. customers borrow funds from other users on the platform in order to 
trade bitcoins on a leveraged basis.89  Because Bitfinex was not a regis-
tered exchange with the CFTC, and because the purchased bitcoins were 
never delivered to the purchasers but were held in deposit wallets owned 
and controlled by Bitfinex, the exchange was in violation of sections 4(a) 
and 4d of the CEA.90  
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of Bitfinex is its association 
with the virtual currency Tether.  Tether was established by the owners 
of Bitfinex and the two companies share a CEO.91  Tether’s value is 
pegged directly to the U.S. dollar, which the company claims is accom-
plished by keeping U.S. dollars equal to the market value of all Tether in 
circulation in reserve at all times.  This claim has been under serious 
doubt for some time, and Tether has yet to provide any audited statements 
confirming the existence of U.S. dollar reserves.92  They did attempt an 
audit to support their dollar reserve claim, but subsequently fired their 
auditor before a final report could be released.93  
 
 87. Clare Baldwin, Bitcoin Worth $72 Million Stolen from Bitfinex Exchange in Hong 
Kong, REUTERS (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bitfinex-hacked-
hongkong/bitcoin-worth-72-million-stolen-from-bitfinex-exchange-in-hong-kong-
idUSKCN10E0KP. 
 88. Allen Scott, BitFinex’s Hot Wallet Hacked, More than 1,500 Bitcoins Stolen, 
COINTELEGRAPH (May 22, 2015), https://cointelegraph.com/news/breaking-bitfinex-hot-wal-
let-hacked-bitcoins-stolen. 
 89. BFXNA, Inc.,  CFTC No. 16-19, 2016 (June 2, 2016). https://www.cftc.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfbfxnaor-
der060216.pdf. 
 90. Id. at 1.  
 91. See Sarit Markovich, Commentary: The Overlooked Actor that Could Crash Bitcoin, 
FORTUNE (Dec. 5, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/12/05/bitcoin-btc-price-usd-tether-limited-
bitfinex/; Nathaniel Popper, Warning Signs About Another Giant Bitcoin Exchange, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/21/technology/bitcoin-bitfinex-
tether.html. 
 92. On November 1st, 2018, Deltec Bank & Trust in the Bahamas issued a letter that 
claimed Tether held over $1.8 billion in reserves at the bank. The letter was widely scrutinized 
and there remains considerable doubt that Tether is holding adequate, or any, dollar reserves. 
See David Floyd, Deltec Chairman Says Tether Letter on Bank Relationship Is ‘Authentic’, 
COINDESK (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/deltec-chairman-says-tether-letter-on-
bank-relationship-is-authentic/. 
 93. See Paul Vigna & Steven Russolillo, The Mystery Behind Tether, the Crypto World’s 
Digital Dollar, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-mystery-be-
hind-tether-the-crypto-worlds-digital-dollar-1534089601. 
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Beginning in April 2017, a pseudonymous character known as 
“Bitfinex’ed” began making credible94 claims on social media and in blog 
posts that Bitfinex was creating Tether out of thin air and using Tether to 
push up the price of Bitcoin.  Recall that April 2017 was also when Bit-
finex was suspended from contributing to the BRR calculation, although 
the stated reason was due to transfer restrictions.  Bitfinex’ed’s allega-
tions against Bitfinex picked up steam throughout 2017 and by the end of 
the year, stories alleging that Bitfinex was using Tether to push up 
bitcoin’s price appeared in mainstream publications, including The New 
York Times and Forbes.95  
All of this was widely known by the time CME submitted their 
certification on December 1, 2017.  While the certification makes clear 
that Bitfinex was “temporarily suspended” from contributing to the BRR, 
it makes no mention of Bitfinex’s past problems.  In fact, the certification 
seems to imply that Bitfinex will contribute to the BRR calculation once 
the “transfer restrictions” issue is resolved.  
The mention of Bitfinex as a possible BRR Constituent Exchange 
should have been a red flag when the CFTC reviewed the certification.  
While there is no record of the CFTC expressing concern around the po-
tential for Bitfinex to be involved in the BRR calculation, the CFTC was 
apparently interested in the role Bifinex and Tether may have played in 
manipulating bitcoin’s price.  In January 2018, Bloomberg reported that 
the CFTC sent subpoenas on December 6, 2017, to Bitfinex and Tether.96 
Bitfinex’ed’s allegations were effectively proven in June 2018, 
when John Griffin and Amin Shams from the University of Texas-Austin 
analyzed data from the bitcoin and Tether blockchains and found that 
Tether had been used by entities associated with Bitfinex to prop up the 
price of bitcoin during periods when the price was declining.97  Griffin 
and Shams note that their findings provide “substantial support for the 
view that price manipulation may be behind substantial distortive effects 
in cryptocurrencies.”98  Griffin and Shams findings were given additional 
weight when it was reported in November 2018, that the U.S. Justice 
 
 94. Several of Bitfinex’ed’s claims have been independently verified. Specifically, the 
charge that Bitfinex was using Tether to prop up the prince of bitcoin. For more information 
on Bitfinex’ed, see Lawrence Lewitinn, Bitfinex’ed Tells (Almost) All About Tether: The Mod-
ern Consensus Interview, MODERN CONSENSUS (Oct. 17, 2018), https://modernconsen-
sus.com/cryptocurrencies/tether/bitfinexed-interview-tether-bitfinex/.  
 95. Markovich, supra note 91; Popper, supra note 91. 
 96. Matthew Leising, U.S. Regulators Subpoena Crypto Exchange Bitfinex, Tether, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-
30/crypto-exchange-bitfinex-tether-said-to-get-subpoenaed-by-cftc. 
 97. Griffin & Shams, supra note 27.  
 98. Griffin & Shams, supra note 27, at 33. 
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Department was investigating Tether and Bitfinex for possible market 
manipulation.99 
C.         BRR Methodology 
In their certification, CME states that the BRR “is in accordance 
with market best practices and IOSCO [(International Organization of 
Securities Commissions)] principles,” yet they provide no detail on what 
these principles are or evidence that attests to their compliance.100  
IOSCO’s “Principles for Financial Benchmarks” were released in July 
2013, well before Bitcoin was on IOSCO’s radar.101  Furthermore, it does 
not appear that the BRR is in compliance with all nineteen principles.  
Principle 17 requires the benchmark administrator to appoint an “inde-
pendent internal or external auditor with appropriate experience and ca-
pability to periodically review and report on the Administrator’s adher-
ence to its stated criteria and with the Principles.”102  There is no evidence 
that CME, CF, or the Committee conducted an independent audit of the 
BRR. 
CME believes the methodology used to calculate the BRR pre-
vents any kind of manipulation.103  The BRR is calculated daily and is 
based upon all bitcoin trades in U.S. dollars from 3:00 PM to 4:00 PM 
London time, across the four Constituent Exchanges.104  The calculation 
methodology for the BRR is as follows: 
 
1. All Relevant Transactions are added to a joint list, re-
cording the trade price and size for each transaction; 
2. The list is partitioned into twelve equally-sized time 
intervals of five minutes each; 
3. For each partition separately, the volume-weighted 
median trade price is calculated from trades submit-
ted by each exchange; and 
 
 99. See Matt Robinson & Tom Schoenberg, Bitcoin-Rigging Criminal Probe Focused on 
Tie to Tether, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-
11-20/bitcoin-rigging-criminal-probe-is-said-to-focus-on-tie-to-tether. 
 100. Bowen, supra note 74, at 5.  
 101. INT’L ORG. SEC. COMM’N, PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL BENCHMARKS, REPORT 8 (July 
2013), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD415.pdf. 
 102. Id. at 28. 
 103. Bowen, supra note 74, at 5. 
 104. The trades are reported through each constituent exchange’s API to Crypto Facilities. 
See Bowen, supra note 74, at 5. 
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4. The BRR is then calculated as the equally-weighted 
average of the volume weighted medians of all parti-
tions.105   
 
In their certification, CME claims the BRR is resistant to manip-
ulation: “[T]he index is calculated from a large number of trades observed 
during the calculation window.  The combination of volume weighting of 
medians plus non-weighted partitions prevents manipulation in the refer-
ence rate.  Ultimately, influencing the BRR would require significant 
trading activity on several exchanges over an extended period of time.”106  
To support their claim that the BRR cannot be manipulated, the 
CF and CME websites include a paper written in October 2016 by Wil-
liam J. Knottenbelt, Professor of Applied Quantitative Analysis at Impe-
rial College London, and his former student, Andrew Paine, titled “Anal-
ysis of the CME CF Bitcoin Reference Rate and Real Time Index.”107   
Knottenbelt and Pain conclude that “[t]he chosen specification makes the 
BRR highly resistant against manipulation.”108  It should be noted that 
Knottenbelt also serves on the BRR Oversight Committee. 
D.       CFE Reference Rate 
The CFE Bitcoin Futures Contract (“XBT”) is based on the auc-
tion price of Bitcoin in U.S. dollars on the 4 PM EST Gemini Exchange.  
Gemini is a full reserve exchange—meaning that all orders must be fully 
pre-funded with assets on deposit at the exchange.  Because Gemini holds 
customer assets (both fiat and virtual currency) they sought, and received, 
a limited purpose trust company charter from the New York State De-
partment of Financial Services (“NYDFS”) in 2015.  As a condition of 
licensure, Gemini is expected to comply with all the requirements of the 
NYDFS BitLicense regulatory framework, which was finalized in June 
2015.109  The BitLicense is a first in the nation licensing regime specifi-
cally for virtual currency businesses that are based in New York or serve 
New York customers.  In the press release announcing the grant of Gem-
ini’s charter, NYDFS noted that they conducted a “rigorous review” of 
Gemini’s application, which included a review of Gemini’s “anti-money 
 
 105. Bowen, supra note 74, at 5. 
 106. Bowen, supra note 74, at 8. 
 107. Andrew Paine & William J. Knottnbelt, Analysis of the CME CF Bitcoin Reference 
Rate and Real Time Index, IMPERIAL C. CTR. CRYPTOCURRENCY RES. & ENGINEERING 3 (Oct. 
20, 2016), https://www.cmegroup.com/trading/files/bitcoin-white-paper.pdf. 
 108. Id. at 3. 
 109. BitLicense Regulatory Framework, 23 NYCRR Part 200 Virtual currencies (2015), 
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/adoptions/dfsp200t.pdf. 
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laundering, capitalization, consumer protection, and cyber security stand-
ards.”110  
The Gemini auction price is determined by “finding the price at 
which the greatest aggregate buy demand and sell demand from all eligi-
ble orders can be fulfilled; all continuous trading orders and auction-only 
orders are considered.  The auction price then applies to all fills, allocated 
based on price-time priority.”111  Like CME, CFE’s certification empha-
sizes specific qualities of the Gemini exchange and auction process that 
make it difficult to manipulate the XBT contract.  The most convincing 
argument they make is that all Gemini orders, including auction orders, 
must be pre-funded.  Presumably, a would-be manipulator would not go 
through the hassle of creating an account at Gemini—which requires a 
user to verify their identity—and then deposit fiat currency or bitcoin into 
their Gemini account, just so they could influence the Gemini auction 
price (if they did, it would be easy to spot).  
While it may be difficult to manipulate the Gemini auction price, 
Gemini’s low trading volume hampers price discovery for bitcoin and 
could potentially lead to settlement failure in the XBT contract.  In their 
certification, CFE states that on “August 28, 2017[,] the 20-day moving 
average of the Gemini Exchange’s market share in exchange trading in 
bitcoin in U.S. dollars was 12.8%.”  Considering their certification was 
filed on December 1, 2017, the reference to volume data on August 28 
appears arbitrary.  Time-series volume data from data.bitcoinity.org112 
indicates that the August date may have been cherry-picked.  The site 
does not list 20-day moving averages, but historical data for the 30-day 
moving average reveals that Gemini’s peak trading volume as a share of 
the market in USD, occurred in July (~15%) and August (~13%) of 2017.  
Trading volume on Gemini has steadily declined since then.  On Decem-
ber 1, 2017, Gemini accounted for just 7% of the previous 30-days of 
bitcoin trading volume in USD, and that number has continued to come 
down, reaching 4.37% on October 11, 2018.   
In addition to low trading volume on Gemini, the 4 PM auction 
volume is also disturbingly low.  In fact, on many days, the auction clears 
no bitcoin—auction failure occurred six times in September 2018 
alone.113  If the Gemini auction were to fail on the final settlement date 
 
 110. Press Release from New York State Department of Financial Services, NYDFS 
Grants Charter to “Gemini” Bitcoin Exchange Founded by Cameron and Tyler Winklevoss 
(Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1510051.htm. 
 111. Product Certification Letter from Cboe, supra note 74, at 2. 
 112. This is the same data source that is cited by CFE to highlight Gemini trading volume 
in their submission. Product Certification Letter from Cboe, supra note 74, at 3. 
 113. Gemini’s Daily Action Data, GEMINI, https://gemini.com/auction-data/?cur-
rentPage=2&startIndex=1&filter=4PM-BTC-USD#auctionData (last visited Nov. 8, 2018). 
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for a XBT contract, it would cause significant disruption because the con-
tract’s settlement value could not be readily determined.114  So far, this 
has not happened, and should the auction fail on a contract settlement 
date, CFE would resort to the waterfall of possibilities listed in the con-
tract specifications for determining final settlement value.115  Gemini has 
been publishing their auction data since 2016, and the data reveals nu-
merous auction failures since then (including many before CFE filed their 
certification on December 1, 2017).  Yet, there is no indication the CFTC 
expressed concern around Gemini auction volume. 
E.         Manipulation in the Bitcoin Spot Market 
CME and CFE took great care to construct a reference rate for 
bitcoin that is resistant to manipulation.  Assessing the feasibility of ref-
erence rate manipulation is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is 
worth noting there have been no reported instances of manipulation to 
date.  However, evidence of manipulation in bitcoin spot markets is quite 
clear. 
While Bitfinex’s use of Tether may account for much of the 2017 
run-up in bitcoin’s price, many of the more volatile days in bitcoin’s short 
history can be attributed to hacks at virtual currency exchanges.  Accord-
ing to the Wall Street Journal, since 2011, there have been fifty-six virtual 
currency exchange cyberattacks, resulting in $1.63 billion in losses.116  
After each major hack, the price of bitcoin price dropped precipitously.  
There have also been several reports of manipulative trading practices in 
bitcoin spot markets, much of it driven by automated trading programs, 
or “bots.”117  
In September 2018, the New York State Office of the Attorney 
General (the “OAG”) released the “Virtual Markets Integrity Report” (the 
“Report”) which looked into the transparency, fairness, and security of 
 
 114. Auction failure is only a problem when it occurs on a contract settlement date. For all 
other days, the settlement value of bitcoin futures contracts is determined by the midpoint of 
the final bid and offer in each respective futures maturity. See E-mail from Michael Mollet, 
Dir. of Prod. Dev., Cboe Global Markets, to Lee Reiners, Ex. Dir., Global Financial Markets 
Center (Aug. 18, 2018, 10:07 EST) (on file with author).  
 115. See, CBOE, SUMMARY PRODUCT SPECIFICATIONS CHART FOR CBOE BITCOIN (USD) 
FUTURES, http://cfe.cboe.com/cfe-products/xbt-cboe-bitcoin-futures/contract-specifications 
(the contingencies section details how final settlement value will be determined in the event 
normal settlement procedures cannot be utilized). 
 116. Steven Russolillo & Eun-Young Jeong, Cryptocurrency Exchanges are Getting 
Hacked Because it’s Easy, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-
cryptocurrency-exchange-hacks-keep-happening-1531656000. 
 117. Paul Vigna & Alexander Osipovich, Bots are Manipulating Prices of Bitcoin in ‘Wild 
West of Crypto’, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-bots-manipu-
lating-bitcoins-price-1538481600. 
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virtual asset trading platforms.118  The Report found that the virtual cur-
rency industry does not have “serious market surveillance capacities, akin 
to those of traditional trading venues, to detect and punish suspicious 
trading activity.”119  The Report also noted that few of the virtual currency 
exchanges that responded to the OAG’s questions have formal policies in 
place that define “the types of conduct the platform believes to be manip-
ulative or abusive, and outlining how such trading behavior is to be de-
tected and penalized.” 
Furthermore, it has become increasingly clear that much of 
bitcoin’s value—outside of mere speculation—is derived solely from its 
ability to facilitate criminal activity.  In July of 2018, special counsel 
Robert Mueller indicted twelve Russian intelligence officials for alleg-
edly attempting to influence U.S. elections in 2016.120  The indictment 
notes that the conspirators used bitcoin to fund the purchase of servers, 
register domains, and make other payments “in furtherance of hacking 
activity.”121  According to the indictment, the “use of bitcoin allowed the 
Conspirators to avoid direct relationships with traditional financial insti-
tutions, allowing them to evade greater scrutiny of their identities and 
sources of funds.”122  
Remarkably, the CFTC publicly acknowledged their indifference 
to fraud and manipulation in the bitcoin spot market.  Speaking at the 
January 2018 meeting of the CFTC’s Market Risk Advisory Committee 
(“MRAC”), Amir Zaidi, director of the CFTC’s Division of Market Over-
sight (“DMO”), stated:  
 
it is not the responsibility of DCMs [(derivatives clearing 
merchants)] or the CFTC to oversee on a daily basis every 
cash commodity market or make suitability judgments 
about the underlying commodity market and whether a 
futures contract should be able to be listed on it.  Rightly, 
we are not overseeing cash markets and participants on a 
daily basis for abusive practices and risks.  Every cash 
market underlying futures contracts can be manipulated.  
Gold, silver, FX, bitcoin cash markets, they can all be ma-
nipulated.  However, making detailed judgments about 
 
 118. N.Y. ATT’Y GEN., VIRTUAL MARKETS INTEGRITY REPORT (Sept. 18, 2018), https://vir-
tualmarkets.ag.ny.gov/. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Indictment, United State v. Netyksho, No. 1:18-cr-00215-ABJ (July 13, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download. 
 121. Id. at 21. 
 122. Id. at 22. 
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the level of manipulation, generally, in those cash mar-
kets, and if it is too little or too much to list a futures con-
tract, is a different analysis from whether a futures con-
tract is readily susceptible to manipulation.123 
 
In reviewing CME’s and CFE’s self-certifications, the CFTC 
made clear that their sole focus was on the potential to manipulate the 
contracts in question.  At the same MRAC meeting, Zaidi noted that 
“DMO’s analysis of whether a contract is readily susceptible to manipu-
lation from a futures contract listing standpoint, always ties back to the 
integrity of the futures contract and the settlement process.”124  The in-
tegrity of bitcoin futures contracts depends on the integrity of their refer-
ence rate; this is why CME and CFE, along with their constituent ex-
changes, expended significant effort in designing, implementing, and 
explaining their respective reference rates.  However, if the entire bitcoin 
spot market can be manipulated, can a futures contract based on bitcoin 
truly be resistant to manipulation? By not intervening to halt the self-cer-
tifications, the CFTC seems to think it can. 
F.         The SEC Rejects the Winklevoss Bitcoin Trust 
The SEC does not share the CFTC’s indifference to manipulation 
in the bitcoin spot market, as they have repeatedly cited concerns over 
manipulability as a reason for rejecting applications to list bitcoin related 
exchange traded products (“ETPs”).125  The SEC first rejected a bitcoin 
ETP in 2017, when it disapproved126 the Bats BZX Exchange Incorpo-
rated’s (“BZX”) proposed rule change127 to list and trade shares of the 
 
 123. CFTC, TRANSCRIPT OF MARKET RISK ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING (Jan. 31 
2018), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/2018-08/mrac_013118_transcript.pdf [herein-
after TRANSCRIPT OF MARKET RISK ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING]. 
 124. Id at 45. 
 125. This concern was most recently expressed by SEC Chairman Jay Clayton on Novem-
ber 27, 2018, when he stated that concerns over market manipulation need to be addressed 
before a cryptocurrency ETF is approved. See Nikhilesh De, SEC Chair Clayton: Crypto ETF 
Needs Exchanges ‘Free From Manipulation’, COINDESK (Nov. 27, 2018), 
https://www.coindesk.com/clayton-sec-ico-funding-security-offering ( “‘How that [manipu-
lation] issue gets addressed, I don’t have a particular path.  But it needs to be addressed’ before 
an ETF gets approved, Clayton remarked during CoinDesk’s Consensus: Invest confer-
ence.”). 
 126. SEC Disapproval Order, supra note 28. 
 127. Section 19(b) of the Securities Exchange Act Of 1934 requires the exchange seeking 
to list the ETF to submit a proposed rule change to the SEC, which is then released for public 
comment. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (2012). 
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Winklevoss Bitcoin Trust (“Trust”).128  The Trust would hold bitcoins as 
an asset, and the bitcoins would be in the custody of, and secured by, the 
Trust’s custodian, Gemini Trust Company LLC (“Custodian”).  The Trust 
would issue and redeem shares129 that would track the price of bitcoin on 
the Gemini Exchange.130   
BZX filed a petition131 to have the ruling reviewed by the SEC, 
which the SEC granted and then sought public comments in support of, 
or in opposition to, the original order.  Many market observers believed 
the review would result in a favorable outcome for BZX due to further 
maturation in the bitcoin market since their original filing, as well as the 
introduction of bitcoin futures contracts.  However, the SEC once again 
disapproved132 the proposed rule change due to its finding that the pro-
posal did not comply with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Ex-
change Act”) Section 6(b)(5), which, among other requirements, stipu-
lates that the rules of a national securities exchange be designed “to 
prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices” and “to protect 
investors and the public interest.”133 
In their amended proposal, BZX highlighted multiple features of 
the bitcoin market and the Trust that make manipulation unlikely, all of 
which the SEC found unpersuasive.  BZX argued that the large number 
of bitcoin trading venues, and continuous trading on these venues, make 
it difficult to manipulate bitcoin because “there is no single market-close 
for investors to attempt to manipulate.”134  The SEC disagreed, and also 
found the argument irrelevant because the value of the Trust’s shares 
would be based off a single market-close event, the 4 PM EST Gemini 
 
 128. Any sort of investment vehicle that holds virtual currency and offers ownership in-
terests in the vehicle will be considered a security subject to SEC registration unless it meets 
SEC exemption requirements. This is why the SEC must sign off before any sort of bitcoin, 
or other virtual currency, Exchange Traded Fund can enter the market. See SEC, STATEMENT 
ON DIGITAL ASSET SECURITIES ISSUANCE AND TRADING (2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/digital-asset-securites-issuuance-and-trading 
(discussing the registration requirements for initial offers and sales of digital asset securities, 
pooled investment vehicles investing in digital asset securities, and secondary markets trading 
in digital asset securities). 
 129. The Trust would issue and redeem the Shares only in “Baskets” of 100,000 shares 
and only to “Authorized Participants,” and these transactions would be conducted “in-kind” 
for bitcoin only. SEC Disapproval Order, supra note 28, at 3. 
 130. SEC Disapproval Order, supra note 28, at 4. 
 131. Petition for Review, SR-BatsBZX-2016-30, Exchange Act Release No. 80206 (Mar. 
25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/batsbzx/2017/petition-for-review-sr-batsbzx-2016-
30.pdf. 
 132. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-83723 20 (July 26, 
2018) https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2018/34-83723.pdf [hereinafter SEC Release No. 34-
83723]. 
 133. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (2009). 
 134. SEC Release No. 34-83723, supra note 132, at 20. 
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auction—the same auction used to determine the settlement value of CFE 
bitcoin futures contracts.135  Acknowledging that Trust investors would 
have an incentive to manipulate the Gemini auction, the SEC expressed 
doubts that the Gemini auction would facilitate price discovery because:  
 
(a) there is no comprehensive and accurate regulatory 
data source reflecting bitcoin pricing or trading; (b) there 
is no basis to conclude that the Trust’s IIV [(Intraday In-
dicative Value)] 136 would be considered an authoritative 
price when several other spot prices for bitcoin are al-
ready disseminated and often differ from one another; and 
(c) the Trust’s NAV [Net Asset Value] would differ from 
the Gemini Auction price only if the auction price, which 
is publicly disseminated itself, is determined not to reflect 
a fair price for bitcoin.137  
 
The SEC also expressed concern over the low trading volume on 
Gemini.  Historically, when an exchange attempts to list an exchange 
traded product in a market that is “not demonstrably resistant to manipu-
lation,”138 the SEC requires comprehensive surveillance sharing agree-
ments between the exchange and a regulated market related to the under-
lying asset.  While BZX claimed it had entered into a comprehensive 
surveillance-sharing agreement with Gemini, the SEC found Gemini’s 
bitcoin trading volume and liquidity to be insufficient and that a person 
who sought to manipulate the ETP could do so by trading on other ex-
changes, thus rendering the information sharing agreement irrelevant.139  
Furthermore, because the Gemini auction price is used to determine the 
net asset value of the Gemini Trust, “which is publicly disseminated and 
which is the price used for creation and redemption transactions,” low 
auction volumes make manipulation of Trust shares more likely.140  Be-
cause the creation of one Trust share requires the Trust to purchase 1,000 
bitcoin, the creation of a new Trust share could substantially increase the 
 
 135. SEC Release No. 34-83723, supra note 132, at 20. 
 136. The Intraday Indicative Value (IIV) of the Trust would be calculated and dissemi-
nated by the Sponsor, every 15 seconds during BZX’s regular trading session, based on the 
most recent Gemini Auction price. The Net Asset Value (NAV) of the Trust would be calcu-
lated each business day, based on the clearing price of that day’s 4:00p.m. Eastern Time (ET) 
Gemini Exchange bitcoin auction. See SEC Disapproval Order, supra note 28, at 4.  
 137. SEC Release No. 34-83723, supra note 132, at 21. 
 138. SEC Release No. 34-83723, supra note 132, at 21. 
 139. The SEC also found that the Gemini exchange did not constitute a “regulated” ex-
change. See SEC Release No. 34-83723, supra note 132, at 66. 
 140. SEC Release No. 34-83723, supra note 132, at 39. 
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price of bitcoin, and by extension a Trust share, assuming it is purchased 
on the Gemini exchange.141 
 
 
G.         Differences Between the CFTC and SEC When it Comes to New 
Product Approval 
One explanation for why the SEC is concerned about manipula-
tion in the bitcoin spot market, while the CFTC is not, lies in statute.  The 
Exchange Act requires exchanges—in their role as self-regulatory organ-
izations—to file any proposed rule changes with the SEC, who then must 
make an affirmative finding that the proposed rule change is consistent 
with the Exchange Act, and the burden of demonstrating consistency with 
the Exchange Act lies with the exchange proposing the rule change.142  
This contrasts with the self-certification process, which places the burden 
of proof on the CFTC if they wish to prevent an exchange from self-cer-
tifying a new derivatives product. 
The Exchange Act also mandates that the rules of an exchange be 
designed to prevent “fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices.”143  
However, neither the Exchange Act nor SEC regulations differentiate be-
tween fraud and manipulation in the spot (cash) market and the market 
for the product the exchange is seeking to list through the rule change 
proposal (e.g., the Winklevoss Bitcoin Trust).  Therefore, the SEC has 
taken a more expansive view of fraud and manipulation compared to the 
CFTC, which is only focused on fraud and manipulation in the futures 
market. 
The SEC’s broader view makes sense in light of the fundamental 
differences between the two products.  Manipulating a cash settled fu-
tures contract requires the underlying reference price be manipulated, 
which is why so much attention was placed on the bitcoin reference rate 
for the CME and CFE contracts.  Shares of a bitcoin ETP would be priced 
upon transactions in the open market, but the net asset value of the Gem-
ini Trust that would issue the shares is based upon the 4 PM Gemini auc-
tion.  Because the creation (redemption) of an ETP share requires the pur-
chase (sale) of 1,000 bitcoin, any kind of manipulation in the bitcoin spot 
market, regardless of where it occurs, could influence the value of the 
 
 141. The bitcoins don’t have to be purchased from Gemini, but if authorized participants 
are forced to source bitcoin from other venues, the prices may not be aligned with the Gemini 
auction. SEC Release No. 34-83723, supra note 132, at 39. 
 142. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5). 
 143. Id.  
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ETP, which is why the SEC focused more broadly on characteristics of 
the bitcoin spot market.144  
The SEC did identify problematic features of the Gemini ex-
change and auction that are applicable to CFE’s bitcoin futures contract 
but were ignored by the CFTC in their review.  Because the net asset 
value of the Trust is determined by the Gemini auction, the creation and 
redemption of new Trust shares results in the purchase, or sale, of signif-
icantly more (1,000) bitcoin than typically trades on the Gemini 4 PM 
auction.  Therefore, had the SEC approved the BZX rule change, the mere 
act of creating or redeeming Trust shares could have influenced the auc-
tion price and therefore the Trust’s pricing.145  This should have been a 
red flag for the CFTC, which knew that the SEC was reviewing the BZX 
proposal when they reviewed the self-certifications.  If the creation and 
redemption of Trust shares could influence the Gemini auction, it could 
also influence the settlement value of CFE’s bitcoin futures contract.  The 
CFTC was fully aware there could one day be a bitcoin ETP, yet there is 
no evidence they considered the impact an ETP could have on the ability 
to manipulate bitcoin futures. 
Many market observers think a bitcoin exchange traded product 
is inevitable, and already there are indications that the SEC is softening 
its stance.  SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce released a public dissent 
following the SEC’s most recent disapproval of the BZX rule change, in 
which she criticized the majority’s excessive focus on the bitcoin spot 
market.146  Peirce notes that the language of the Exchange Act states that 
“[t]he rules of the exchange” must be designed “to prevent fraudulent and 
manipulative acts and practices.”147  Commissioner Peirce believes this 
language requires a more narrow focus on the actual exchange rule(s) in 
question, in this case, BZX Rule 14.11(e)(4) which governs the listing 
and trading of commodity-based trust shares.148  Peirce believes that this 
rule, coupled with BZX’s role as a self-regulatory organization, is 
 
 144. This problem largely applies to any kind of exchange-traded product that is based on 
an illiquid asset. See, e.g., Ian Foucher & Kyle Gray, Exchange-Traded Funds: Evolution of 
Benefits, Vulnerabilities and Risks, BANK OF CAN. FIN. SYS. REV. 37, 42 (Dec. 2014) (discuss-
ing liquidity risk in the context of “Authorized Participants”); DEPOSITORY TRUST CLEARING 
CORP., THE NEXT CRISIS WILL BE DIFFERENT: OPPORTUNITIES TO CONTINUE ENHANCING 
FINANCIAL STABILITY 10 YEARS AFTER LEHMAN’S INSOLVENCY, INDUSTRY WHITE PAPER 13 
(Sept. 2018). 
 145. SEC Release No. 34-83723, supra note 132, at 39. 
 146. Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Dissent of Commissioner 
Hester M. Peirce to Release No. 34-83723; File No. SR-BatsBZX-2016-30 (July 26, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/peirce-dissent-34-83723#_ftn3. 
 147. Id. (emphasis added by Peirce). 
 148. CBOE BZX EXCHANGE, INC., RULES OF CBOE BZX EXCHANGE, INC., 238 (Updated last 
Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.batstrading.com/resources/regula-
tion/rule_book/BATS_Exchange_Rulebook.pdf. 
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sufficient to prevent fraud and manipulation in the Trust shares.  Peirce 
states that the “Commission steps beyond this limited role when it focuses 
instead on the quality and characteristics of the markets underlying a 
product that an exchange seeks to list.”149 
Peirce’s insistence that the SEC focus exclusively on the pro-
posed product mirrors the approach taken by the CFTC.  However, the 
Exchange Act language is more ambiguous than the CEA and CFTC reg-
ulations, therefore allowing for greater discretion in its interpretation by 
SEC commissioners.  Specifically, the Exchange Act does not state where 
fraud and manipulation should be prevented. Such discretion leaves open 
the possibility for some form of virtual currency exchange traded product 
to enter the market in the near future, provided the SEC includes more 
commissioners who share Commissioner Peirce’s views.  
IV.  BITCOIN FUTURES INTRODUCE SYSTEMIC RISK 
A.       Bitcoin Futures as Speculative Investments 
Neither the CFTC nor the SEC considered the economic purpose 
of bitcoin derivatives in their respective reviews.150  The CFTC acknowl-
edged that even had it been considered, it would play no role in their de-
cision-making. Speaking at the MRAC meeting, Amir Zaidi, the Director 
of the CFTC’s Division of Market Oversight, noted that “[q]uestionable 
social utility and price valuations of a new asset class are not sufficient 
reasons for the CFTC to set regulatory policy.”151  
Although not required, CFE attempted to articulate the economic 
utility of bitcoin futures in their self-certification, stating that the con-
tracts “could be used by a number of different groups for commercial 
purposes, including by bitcoin miners to hedge production costs, bitcoin 
merchant processors to hedge inventories, merchants that accept bitcoin 
to hedge bitcoin inventories, and holders of bitcoin that wish to hedge 
their bitcoin holdings.”152  While some within these groups may desire 
bitcoin futures for genuine hedging purposes, their numbers are far too 
small to warrant the development of a new futures contract.  Furthermore, 
the public record shows scant evidence of commercial entities advocating 
 
 149. Peirce, supra note 146.  
 150. This is largely because the relevant statutes do not require them to. However, Section 
6(b)(5) of the Exchange Act does require the rule of an exchange be designed to “protect 
investors and the public interest.” This language is broad enough to allow the SEC to consider 
the economic utility of new products, but rarely do they do so. 15 U.S.C. § 78f. 
 151. TRANSCRIPT OF MARKET RISK ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING, supra note 123. 
 152. Product Certification Letter from Choe, supra note 74, at 4.  
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for the creation of bitcoin derivatives products for risk management pur-
poses. 
Bitcoin’s limitations as a payment method are well documented: 
it is too volatile, transactions take far longer to process than credit card 
networks, and transaction costs are high compared to traditional payment 
methods.153  Although exact data is difficult to ascertain, anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that very few merchants accept bitcoin as payment, and 
for those that do, bitcoin constitutes a very small fraction of total sales 
volume.  
It is clear that demand for bitcoin derivatives is coming not from 
merchants that transact in bitcoin, but from speculators that want bitcoin 
exposure without having to own actual bitcoin.154  In their proposed rule 
change to list and trade shares of the Winklevoss Bitcoin Trust, BZX 
acknowledged the obvious: “The Shares are designed for investors seek-
ing a cost-effective and convenient means of gaining investment expo-
sure to bitcoin similar to a direct investment in bitcoin.”155  
Given that activity in the bitcoin spot market is primarily specu-
lative, it follows that any kind of bitcoin derivative would appeal princi-
pally to speculators.  Many scholars have equated speculating in financial 
markets to gambling,156 whose social ills have long been understood.157  
Speculation in financial markets is made possible when two or more par-
ties have different views about future economic events.  Eric Posner and 
Glen Weyl argue that when parties act on this difference through financial 
speculation (gambling), it is welfare-reducing and contributes to systemic 
risk by increasing the overall level of risk in the financial system.158  
 
 153. See, Governor Philip Lowe, Address to the 2017 Australian Payment Summit Syd-
ney, n.3 (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2017/sp-gov-2017-12-13.html#r3 
(discussing the drawbacks of cryptocurrencies, such as bitcoin, and why traditional banks are 
still likely to play an essential role in electronic payments). 
 154. There are many reasons why an investor may avoid the bitcoin spot market: it’s un-
regulated, exchanges frequently get hacked, private keys may be lost. See Levine, supra note 
13 (noting the reasons why investors seeking exposure to bitcoin may prefer cash-settled fu-
tures to actual bitcoin). 
 155. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Release No. 34-79183 at 44 (Oct. 28, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/batsbzx/2016/34-79183.pdf. 
 156. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, An FDA for Financial Innovation: Applying 
the Insurable Interest Doctrine to Twenty-First-Century Financial Markets, 107 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1307 (2015) (insert parenthetical); Timothy E. Lynch, Gambling by Another Name; The 
Challenge of Purely Speculative Derivatives, 17 STAN. J. L., BUS., & FIN. 67 (2012). 
 157. GEOFFREY CLARK, BETTING ON LIVES: THE CULTURE OF LIFE INSURANCE IN ENGLAND, 
1695−1775 (1999) (for a general critique of using life insurance contracts as a vehicle for 
gambling). 
 158. This argument is premised on the assumption that market participants are risk averse. 
See Posner & Weyl, supra note 156, at 1309 (“[G]ambling may have some ancillary benefits 
in improving the information in market prices. However, it is overwhelmingly a negative-sum 
activity, which, in the aggregate, harms the people who engage in it, and which can also pro-
duce negative third-party effects by increasing systemic risk in the economy.”). 
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Taking these arguments as given, this section assesses the other ways in 
which bitcoin futures contracts contribute to systemic risk, defined as the 
risk that a disruption in the financial system could impair all, or parts of, 
the financial system and potentially have negative consequences for the 
real economy.159 
While there are a number of factors that contribute to the accu-
mulation, materialization, and transmission of systemic risk, there is no 
universally accepted accounting of all these factors.160  Rather than re-
view the academic literature on systemic risk factors, the analysis below 
focuses solely on the factors that are most relevant to bitcoin futures. 
B.       New Interconnections and Risk Concentrations 
Interconnections between various firms and markets in the finan-
cial system may allow systemic risk to accumulate and can facilitate the 
transmission of economic shocks throughout the system.161  Interconnec-
tions between firms can take the form of “asset interconnectedness” 
and/or “liability interconnectedness.”162  Asset interconnectedness occurs 
when one or more financial institutions have direct credit exposure to a 
failed financial institution.  Liability interconnectedness refers to the sit-
uation where a financial institution provides funding to other institutions 
and the withdrawal of that funding leads to a cascade of firm failures.  
Interconnections can also form between various markets and asset clas-
ses.  For instance, derivatives can connect the regulated sector with the 
unregulated sector if the underlying asset is unregulated. 
 
 159. There is no universally accepted definition of systemic risk, so I have borrowed heav-
ily from the definition supplied by the International Monetary Fund, Bank for International 
Settlements, and the Financial Stability Board. INT’L MONETARY FUND ET AL., GUIDANCE TO 
ASSESS THE SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS AND 
INSTRUMENTS: INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS (Report to the G-20 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors Oct. 28 2009), https://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/100109.pdf. 
 160. See, e.g., Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study In Financial Innovation, 
Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657 (2012); Manuel A. Utset, Complex 
Financial Institutions and Systemic Risk, 45 Ga. L. Rev. 779 (2011); Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Systemic Risk. Duke Law School Legal Studies Paper No. 163; GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL, 
Vol. 97, No. 1, (2008); Viral V. Acharya, et al., Measuring Systemic Risk. AFA 2011 Denver 
Meetings Paper 1 (2010); Olivier de Bandt & Philipp Hartmann, Systemic Risk: A Survey, 
ECB Working Paper No. 35 (2000); Monica Billio, et al., Econometric measures of connect-
edness and systemic risk in the finance and insurance sectors, 104 J. of Fin. Econ. 535 (2012).   
 161. See, e.g., Judge, supra note 160 (discussing the increased systemic risk caused by the 
securitization of home loans in the context of the 2008 financial crisis); Stefano Battiston et 
al. The Price of Complexity in Financial Networks, 113(36) PNAS 10031 (Sept. 6, 2016), 
http://www.pnas.org/content/113/36/10031.  
 162. Hal S. Scott, Interconnectedness and Contagion, COMMITTEE ON CAP. MKT. REG. 
(Nov. 20, 2012), https://www.capmktsreg.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/2012.11.20_In-
terconnectedness_and_Contagion.pdf.  
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The introduction of bitcoin futures created new connections be-
tween firms and market sectors.  Most significantly, it pierced the barrier 
that had previously separated the unregulated bitcoin spot market from 
the regulated financial system.163  Not only did bitcoin futures expose two 
regulated futures exchanges to the risks associated with a new asset class, 
but they exposed Futures Commission Merchants (“FCMs”) to these risks 
as well.  FCMs solicit orders to buy and sell futures contracts from retail 
and institutional investors; margin and guarantee customer trades; and in 
some instances, extend credit to customers.  The nine largest FCMs164 are 
owned by firms classified as global systemically important banks (“G-
SIBs”) by the Financial Stability Board.165  Accordingly, bitcoin futures 
contracts transformed what was previously an unregulated asset class 
dominated by retail investors, into a lengthy intermediation chain that in-
cludes some of the world’s largest exchanges, clearinghouses, and too-
big-to-fail financial institutions. 
Bitcoin futures also brought central counterparty clearinghouses 
(“CCPs” or “clearinghouses”) into the bitcoin intermediation chain.  A 
CCP interposes itself between counterparties to contracts traded in one or 
more financial markets—becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller 
to every buyer—thereby ensuring the performance of the contracts.166  
The use of central clearing expanded substantially after the financial cri-
sis when G20 leaders agreed that “all standardized OTC derivative con-
tracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, 
where appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties by end-
2012 at the latest.”167  While the growth in central clearing has removed 
much of the counterparty credit risk associated with bilateral trading ex-
posures that proved so detrimental in 2008, it has led to new concerns 
 
 163. There had been other bitcoin derivatives prior to bitcoin futures but these were less 
liquid, lightly traded, and generally accessible to qualified investors only. See LabCFTC, su-
pra note 4 (providing an overview of virtual currencies). 
 164. Based on customer funds held in segregation. 2017 Top FMCs, AISOURCE (Feb. 28, 
2018), https://www.managedfuturesinvesting.com/2017-top-fcms/. 
 165. FIN. STABILITY BOARD, 2017 LIST OF GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS (G-
SIBS), (Nov. 21, 2017), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P211117-1.pdf. 
 166. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS & INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, PRINCIPLES FOR 
FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES 9 (2012), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf 
(noting the definition of central counterparty). 
 167. G20 Leaders Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, provided by G20 Research Group 
(Sept. 24–35, 2009), http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html. 
2019] BITCOIN FUTURES 95 
that too much risk is concentrated at CCPs,168 making them a potential 
source of systemic risk.169  
Not only do CCPs concentrate risk by combining the exposures 
of all clearing members on their own balance sheet, but they also form 
new connections due to the fact that other financial institutions may have 
relationships with CCPs as clearing members, custodians, settlement 
banks, credit and liquidity providers, and investment counterparties.170  
The fear is that problems at one or more CCPs could be the spark that 
allows systemic risk to travel throughout, and infect, the rest of the finan-
cial system.171  
This fear is not unfounded.  In August 2018, the Financial Stabil-
ity Board, the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, 
the International Organization of Securities Commissions, and the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, released a report that assessed cen-
tral clearing interdependencies utilizing data collected from twenty-six 
CCPs across fifteen jurisdictions.172  The report found that the two largest 
CCPs accounted for nearly 40% of the prefunded financial resources, in 
the form of initial margin and default fund contributions, provided to all 
CCPs.173  The report also found that eleven clearing members are con-
nected to between sixteen and twenty-five CCPs.  As the report notes: 
“This indicates that the default of a CCP’s clearing member could result 
in defaults of the same entity or affiliates in up to 24 other CCPs.”  
CME’s bitcoin futures contract is cleared through CME’s own 
clearing entity (“CME ClearPort”) while CFE’s contract is cleared 
through the Options Clearing Corporation (“OCC”).174 Given bitcoin’s 
novelty and unique risk characteristics, several members of these CCPs—
many of whom are FCMs—expressed concern over the launch of bitcoin 
 
 168. See, Jeanna Smialek, Gary Cohn Calls Clearinghouses a ‘New Systemic Problem’, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 15, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-15/white-
house-s-cohn-calls-clearinghouses-a-new-systemic-problem (“As ‘we get less transparency, 
we get less liquid assets in the clearinghouse, it does start to resonate to me to be a new sys-
temic problem in the system,’ Cohn, director of the White House’s National Economic Coun-
cil, said at a banking conference in Washington.”). 
 169. To better understand the risks associated with CCPs, see Colleen Baker, Clearing-
houses for Over-The-Counter Derivatives 32–35 (Volcker Alliance, Working Paper Nov. 
2016). 
 170. Id. at 7. 
 171. Also called contagion. 
 172. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION ET AL., ANALYSIS OF CENTRAL 
CLEARING INTERDEPENDENCIES (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d181.pdf. 
 173. The report does not mention any of the CCPs by name. 
 174. CFE’s parent entity, Cboe Global Markets Inc., is one of three shareholders in the 
OCC. The other two are Intercontinental Exchange Inc.’s New York Stock Exchange and 
Nasdaq. See Gunjan Banerji, A Messy Battle Brews in the Options Market, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 
22, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-messy-battle-brews-in-the-options-market-
1534939201?redirect=amp#click=https://t.co/l1XXjheHPv. 
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futures.  In fact, upon initial launch, several FCMs, including those con-
trolled by JPMorgan, Bank of America, and Citigroup, refused to offer 
their customers access to bitcoin futures due to concerns around client 
suitability and overall volatility in the bitcoin spot market.175  
Clearinghouse members also questioned the appropriateness of 
utilizing the self-certification process to list novel products like bitcoin 
futures.  Shortly before the launch of CFE’s contract, the Futures Industry 
Association (“FIA”), a global trade organization for the futures, options, 
and centrally cleared derivatives markets, sent an open letter to CFTC 
Chairman Christopher Giancarlo, arguing that the self-certification of 
bitcoin futures did not allow for adequate dialogue between regulators, 
exchanges, clearinghouses and clearing members.176  The FIA’s main 
concern is that clearing members who do not trade bitcoin futures may be 
forced to cover any losses—through guarantee fund contributions and as-
sessment obligations—should a clearing member who does trade bitcoin 
futures default.  The FIA believes “a public discussion should have been 
had on whether a separate guarantee fund for this product was appropriate 
or whether exchanges put additional capital in front of the clearing mem-
ber guarantee fund.”177 
Under CFTC Regulation 40.6, derivatives clearing organizations 
(“DCOs”) are required to submit any new rule changes or rule amend-
ments to the CFTC, which then has ten days to review the submission 
before the rule or amendment takes effect.178  Furthermore, because CME 
has been designated as a systemically important DCO (“SIDCO”) by the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council, they must provide the CFTC with 
sixty days’ advanced notice of any proposed changes to its rules, proce-
dures, or operations that could materially affect the nature or level of risk 
presented by the SIDCO.179  Despite bitcoin’s novelty, CME and the OCC 
proposed using their existing margin methodology for bitcoin futures.  
With no change to their margin methodology or to their existing risk man-
agement practices, there was no need to file a rule change.180  
 
 175. See Alexander Osipovich et al., Wall Street Banks Hit Pause Button on Bitcoin, WALL 
ST J. (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wall-street-banks-hit-pause-button-on-
bitcoin-1512674703. 
 176. Open letter from Walt Lukken, Chief Exec. Officer, Futures Industry Association to 
Christopher Giancarlo, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Dec. 6 2017), 
https://fia.org/articles/open-letter-cftc-chairman-giancarlo-regarding-listing-cryptocurrency-
derivatives. 
 177. Id.  
 178. 17 C.F.R. § 40.6. 
 179. 17 C.F.R. § 40.10. 
 180. The CFTC agreed with this assessment. From the MRAC meeting, “We had discus-
sions with them; we checked on that; and we agreed that there was no rule change that was 
required in terms of operations and procedures.” See TRANSCRIPT OF MARKET RISK ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE MEETING, supra note 123, at 72. 
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The clearinghouses’ basic argument for not filing a rule change 
was that they have a long history of risk managing and margining volatile 
financial products, and that bitcoin futures did not present any unique 
risks they had not seen before.  The CFTC agreed with this assessment 
despite clear evidence that bitcoin does present novel risks and a 2013 
censure of the OCC’s risk management practices by the SEC.181  The 
CFTC even acknowledged that product novelty does not factor into its 
risk assessments.  Speaking at the MRAC meeting in January 2018, Brian 
Bussey, the CFTC’s director of the Division of Clearing and Risk 
(“DCR”), stated that DCR does not consider the “clearing of a new prod-
uct standing alone as a change that could materially affect the nature or 
level of risks presented by a SIDCO.”182 
The key challenge for both clearinghouses leading up to contract 
launch was establishing an appropriate margin methodology.  CFTC reg-
ulation 39.13 requires initial margin to meet a 99% confidence level 
“based on data from an appropriate historic time period.”183  According 
to the CFTC, the initial margin requirements established by CME and the 
OCC for bitcoin futures approached the “100 percent confidence level 
based on available data that we have going back five years in Bloom-
berg.”184  Considering that bitcoin was less than ten years old at the time, 
and did not surpass the $1,000 price level until February 2017, five years 
may not have been “an appropriate historic time period.”185  
Relying on recent data for risk models has a well-documented and 
problematic history.  During the financial crisis, value-at-risk (“VaR”) 
models for measuring investment-portfolio risk grossly underestimated 
risk in part by overly relying on data from recent periods of market tran-
quility.  The consequences of recency bias in risk models revealed them-
selves again in February 2018.  On February 5, a 4.1% drop in the S&P 
500 led the Cboe volatility index (the “VIX”) to spike after it had been at 
near record lows for several years prior.186  The spike in volatility led 
exchange traded products (“ETPs”) that bet against the VIX to lose more 
 
 181. See Jacob Bunge, SEC Criticizes Management at Options Clearing Corp., WALL ST. 
J. (Oct. 22, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-criticizes-management-at-options-clear-
ing-corp-1382414459?mod=article_inline. 
 182. Busey stated that DCR has reviewed new products pursuant to Regulation 40.10 in 
the past; but when it has done so, it has been in combination with a new margin methodology 
or changes to an existing margin methodology, or other changes to risk management involved 
with the introduction of the new product. See TRANSCRIPT OF MARKET RISK ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE MEETING, supra note 123, at 72. 
 183. 17 C.F.R. § 39.13(g)(2)(iii).  
 184. TRANSCRIPT OF MARKET RISK ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING supra note 123, at 82. 
 185. 17 C.F.R. § 39.13(g)(2)(iii). 
 186. INVESTING.COM, https://www.investing.com/indices/us-spx-500-historical-data (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2019) (providing historical data on the S&P 500). 
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than 80% of their value and several of these ETPs were forced to shut 
down.187  Trading losses associated with VIX products also led to a jump 
in margin breaches at the OCC.  The OCC reported that the average size 
of traders’ margin breaches jumped from $26,355 at the end of 2017 to 
$61.4 million in the first quarter of 2018,188 prompting the CFTC and 
SEC to open an investigation into the OCC’s margining practices. 
It did not take long for bitcoin’s limited price history to force 
changes in how bitcoin futures were margined.  In conversations with the 
CFTC prior to self-certification, CME stated they had established a range 
of 27% to “the mid 30s” for initial margin on bitcoin futures.189  The 
CFTC backtested the 27% figure and agreed that it met the 99% confi-
dence level requirement, but significant upside volatility in the bitcoin 
spot market in the fall of 2018 led CME to settle on a 35% initial margin 
requirement by the time they submitted their self-certification on Decem-
ber 1, 2017.190  Bitcoin’s volatility reached record highs in December 
2017, with the price rising from $10,859 on December 1 to $15,036 on 
December 10 (the date CFE launched their futures contract).191  The jump 
in volatility compelled CME to increase initial margin requirements yet 
again, to 47%, on December 12, just five days prior to the launch of their 
contract. 192  Despite the ratcheting up of CME’s initial margin require-
ment in response to increased volatility in the weeks leading up the launch 
of bitcoin futures, the CFTC maintains that the originally proposed 27% 
initial margin requirement “would have been within the confidence re-
quirements of our regulations.”193  
Bitcoin clearly has unique risk characteristics that, when coupled 
with a limited price history, makes managing related risk exposures chal-
lenging.  While there has yet to be a known margin breach associated 
with a bitcoin futures position, there is no guarantee there never will be.  
If there is, financial institutions that previously thought they had no 
 
 187. See Asjiylyn Loder & Dave Michaels, Market Volatility Strikes Exchanges-Traded 
Products, Alarming Investors and Regulators, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 12, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/market-volatility-strikes-exchange-traded-products-alarming-
investors-and-regulators-1518440400?mod=article_inline. 
 188. Dave Michaels & Gunjan Barerji, Regulators Probe Options Market’s Major Clear-
inghouse, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/regulators-probe-major-
clearinghouse-of-options-market-1533202200?mod=article_inline. 
 189. TRANSCRIPT OF MARKET RISK ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING, supra note 123, at 
120. 
 190. Id. 
 191. COINMARKETCAP, supra note 15. 
 192. See Annie Massa, Higher Margins Set for CME’s Soon-to-Launch Bitcoin Futures, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-12/higher-
margins-set-for-cme-s-soon-to-launch-bitcoin-futures. 
 193. Transcript of Market Risk Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 123, at 121. 
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exposure to bitcoin may find that through bitcoin futures, they became 
enmeshed in a volatile, and largely unregulated, global asset class. 
C.       Complexity 
The role of complex financial products in the 2008 financial crisis 
is well-documented.194  Complexity allows systemic risk to accumulate 
in the financial system unnoticed by market participants and regulators.195  
In the run-up to 2008, many “sophisticated” investors purchased mort-
gage-backed securities and other securities tied to the housing market 
whose risk characteristics they thought they understood.196  When hous-
ing prices declined, many of these securities defaulted or lost much of 
their value, and their investors were threatened with insolvency.  In an 
effort to meet demands for more collateral, many of these investors were 
forced to liquidate additional assets, which led to further declines in asset 
prices (known as the “fire-sale” dynamic).  
Bitcoin futures contracts are also complex.  While futures con-
tracts have existed for over 100 years and are a fairly straightforward 
product, bitcoin itself is a new asset class that is not widely understood.197  
A 2018 survey of over 5,000 American adults found that 60% of respond-
ents have heard of bitcoin while only 5% own bitcoin.198  While this gap 
is likely due to a number of factors, a lack of understanding of how bitcoin 
works is certainly a contributor.  
Adding to the confusion around bitcoin is the concept known as 
a “hard fork.”199  A hard fork is a permanent divergence from the previous 
version of the bitcoin blockchain; nodes running previous versions of the 
blockchain protocol will no longer be accepted by the newest version.  
 
 194. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 
WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 241–42 (2009); see Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, And The 
Regulation of Modern Financial Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235 (2012).  
 195. See, e.g., Heather Hughes, Financial Product Complexity, Moral Hazard, and the 
Private Law, 20 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 179 (2015); Judge, supra note 160; Battiston et al., 
supra note 161. 
 196. This understanding was facilitated by the credit ratings agencies who supplied favor-
able ratings to many of these securities. See e.g., Marc Allen Eisner, Before the Third Act: 
Crony Capitalism and the Origins of the Financial Crisis, 11 GEO. J. OF L. & TECH. 391, 409 
(2013) (discussing the role credit rating agencies played in contributing to the crisis). 
 197. It would be like if mortgage-backed securities were complex because no one under-
stood what a mortgage was. 
 198. Survey Monkey and Global Blockchain Business Council Study American Attitudes 
on Bitcoin, COINWIRE (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.coinwire.com/survey-monkey-and-
global-blockchain-business-council-study-american-attitudes-on-bitcoin. 
 199. See Understanding Hard Forks in Cryptocurrency, CRYPTOCURRENCY FACTS 
https://cryptocurrencyfacts.com/understanding-hard-forks-cryptocurrency/ (last visited Jan. 
29, 2019). 
100 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 23 
This leads to a fork in the blockchain (thus the term “hard-fork”): one 
path follows the new, upgraded blockchain, and the other continues along 
the old path.  The bitcoin blockchain has undergone several hard forks in 
its short history,200 typically due to disagreements amongst bitcoin devel-
opers over transaction processing speed.  The most notable hard fork oc-
curred in August 2017, when Bitcoin Cash was created.201  Should an-
other hard fork of the main bitcoin protocol occur in the future, there will 
be uncertainty as to which asset is underlying bitcoin futures contracts.   
CME and CFE describe their hard fork policy in their self-certi-
fications.  CFE states that if a hard fork were to occur, the final settlement 
value of their bitcoin futures contract will be based on the form of bitcoin 
traded on the Gemini Exchange.202  They note, “Gemini will elect to sup-
port the Bitcoin Network that has the greatest cumulative computational 
difficulty for the forty-eight hour period following a given hard fork.”203  
CME’s hard fork policy is more vague: “the exchange shall have the dis-
cretion to take action in consultation with market participants to align 
Bitcoin Futures position holder exposures with cash market exposures as 
appropriate.”204  
The potential for a hard fork adds to the complexity of bitcoin 
futures contracts.  Most investors in bitcoin futures are probably una-
ware of what would happen to their contract in the event of a hard fork, 
and if another hard fork were to occur, it could be a triggering event that 
leads to mass selling in the bitcoin spot market as well as the futures 
market.205 
D.       Market Size 
Size is a key indicator of a market’s systemic importance206—the 
bigger the market, the greater the economic cost should that market fail.  
Presently, the virtual currency market is not big enough to pose a 
 
 200. Nathan Reiff, A History of Bitcoin Hard Forks, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 25, 2018), 
https://www.investopedia.com/tech/history-bitcoin-hard-forks/. 
 201. Bitcoin cash itself underwent a hard fork on November 15, 2018, leading to the cre-
ation of Bitcoin SV. See, Nathan Reif, All About the Bitcoin Cash Hard Fork, INVESTOPEDIA 
(Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/news/all-about-bitcoin-cash-hard-fork/.  
 202. Product Certification Letter from Cboe, supra note 74, at 5. 
 203. Product Certification Letter from Cboe, supra note 74, at 5.  
 204. Bowen, supra note 74, at 11.  
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closure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601 (2012).  
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systemic risk.  In a March 2018 letter to G20 finance ministers and central 
bank governors, the Financial Stability Board acknowledged that 
“crypto-assets do not pose risks to global financial stability at this 
time.”207  The letter notes that the combined global market value of all 
crypto-assets was less than 1% of global GDP; “[i]n comparison, just 
prior to the global financial crisis, the notional value of credit default 
swaps was 100% of global GDP.”208  
While the crypto-asset market may currently be too small to 
threaten financial stability, financial markets are not static.  The virtual 
currency market has exhibited extraordinary growth and volatility in a 
short period of time.  As of December 1, 2018, bitcoin’s market capitali-
zation was approximately $73 billion.209  Although this is $156 billion 
less than what it was at the beginning of 2018,210 it still stands in stark 
contrast to bitcoin’s market capitalization on January 1, 2017, of approx-
imately $16 billion.211  Bitcoin futures contracts and other virtual cur-
rency investment products provide an opportunity for this market to grow 
further by bringing in new investor classes.  Should the SEC ever approve 
a bitcoin exchange traded product, the virtual currency market would 
grow even larger. 
The evolution of the mortgage-backed securities market may 
serve as a useful analogy when considering the potential for the virtual 
currency market to reach systemic proportions.  The first mortgage-
backed security (“MBS”) was issued in 1968; it was privately issued but 
guaranteed by the Government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie 
Mae”).212  In 1971, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(“Freddie Mac”) issued its first MBS and ten years later, the Federal 
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National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) issued its first MBS.213  
These initial issuances were simple pass-through securities, whereby in-
vestors would receive a proportional share of the monthly principal and 
interest payments from the underlying loans.  It wasn’t until 1983 that the 
first multiclass MBS, or Collateralized Mortgage Obligation (“CMO”), 
was issued by Freddie Mac.214  The MBS market grew gradually over the 
next decade, to the point where in 1996, total MBS issuances were ap-
proximately $550 billion.215  But then, the market began to grow expo-
nentially, topping over $1.2 trillion in new issuance in 1998 and hitting a 
peak of $3.5 trillion in new issuance in 2003.216 
The growth in MBS paralleled, and contributed to, a growth in 
home prices that proved unsustainable.  When the housing market col-
lapsed beginning in 2006, it ultimately led to the near collapse of the fi-
nancial system and a severe recession.  The drop-in home prices revealed 
previously unknown connections between firms and sectors within the 
financial system.  Many of these connections were formed by the pur-
chase, sale, and repackaging of MBS. 
It took decades for the MBS market to evolve to the point where 
it threatened financial stability.  What began as a relatively straightfor-
ward product that was issued and guaranteed by government agencies or 
government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”), slowly morphed into a 
product with multiple, complex variations that involved GSEs, rating 
agencies, Wall Street firms, non-bank mortgage lenders, mortgage bro-
kers and a diverse pool of investors that spanned the globe.  
Ten years after bitcoin’s launch, the virtual currency market has 
evolved in ways that even bitcoin’s earliest and most ardent supporters 
would have had a hard time imagining.  What will the market look like 
ten years from now?  Of course, this question cannot be answered with 
any certainty, just as the future of the MBS market could not have been 
predicted with any certainty in the 1970s or 1980s.  There are critical 
differences between the two markets that challenge an exact comparison.  
Most notably, the growth in the MBS market was encouraged and nur-
tured by the government, which viewed MBS as a tool to promote home 
ownership.217  Virtual currency lacks such government support, and at 
 
 213. Id. at 177. 
 214. CMOs divided the issuance into tranches, with the first tranche receiving first rights 
to all principal payments (plus appropriate interest) from the underlying loans. Id. 
 215. US Mortgage-Related Issuance and Outstanding, SIFMA (Nov. 5, 2018), 
https://www.sifma.org/resources/research/us-mortgage-related-issuance-and-outstanding/. 
 216. Id. 
 217. See, e.g., Richard K. Green & Susan M. Wachter., The American Mortgage in His-
torical and International Context, 14 J. OF ECON. PERS. 93, 94–100 (2005); N. Eric Weiss & 
Katie Jones, Cong. Res. Serv., R42995, An Overview of the Housing Finance System in the 
United States, 7–12 (2017); Peter Wallison, Hidden in Plain Sight 100–237 (reprint ed. 2016); 
2019] BITCOIN FUTURES 103 
present, serves no useful social function, except in limited circum-
stances.218  Still, the virtual currency market will likely continue to 
grow—its exact pace unknown—aided in part by the creation of deriva-
tive products that will allow a greater number of investors to gain expo-
sure to the asset class.  This growth, when combined with the new con-
nections that accompany it, will increase the systemic importance of the 
virtual currency market. 
E.       Procyclical Regulation 
Procyclical regulatory policies and political economy are typi-
cally excluded from academic analysis around systemic risk factors.219  
While their exact relationship to systemic risk is difficult to quantify, the 
historical record demonstrates that periods of financial boom preceding a 
crisis are typically accompanied by government policies that amplify 
credit booms, facilitate the growth of new financial product innovations, 
weaken existing regulations, and allow for regulatory forbearance.220  In 
essence, procyclical regulatory policies can create the conditions under 
which systemic risk is allowed to grow.  
Bitcoin futures contracts were introduced in the midst of the long-
est bull market in U.S. history221 and at a time when U.S. financial regu-
latory agencies were pursuing deregulatory policies in line with the stated 
goals of President Trump.  In May 2018, the President signed the Eco-
nomic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act into 
law.222  Also in May 2018, U.S. regulators released a proposal to 
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“simplify and tailor compliance requirements” relating to the Volcker 
rule.223  The Volcker Rule was enacted as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 and it prohibits 
banks from trading for their own account or investing in, or sponsoring, 
hedge funds and private equity funds.  
Viewed in isolation, these changes may have little impact on sys-
temic risk.  But, when observed through a broader historical lens, these 
changes fit a clear pattern of dialing-back financial regulation during pe-
riods of financial boom.  A more permissive regulatory environment also 
facilitates the development of new financial products with unique risk 
characteristics.  It is no coincidence that bitcoin futures were introduced 
eight years into a record bull market run.224  In addition to technological 
developments, bitcoin futures were made possible by investors’ appetite 
for higher yielding assets—since the bull market has pushed the prices up 
for other financial assets—and a relaxed regulatory environment.  Unfor-
tunately, history indicates these factors often foretell of a coming finan-
cial crisis.225 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has contested the CFTC’s claim that they had no 
grounds for halting the self-certification of bitcoin futures contracts.  
There were several red flags that should have been identified during the 
CFTC’s “heightened review” of the contracts, all of which call into ques-
tion the compliance with CFTC Core Principle 3: “[t]he board of trade 
shall list on the contract market only contracts that are not readily suscep-
tible to manipulation.”226  
In reviewing the contracts, the CFTC focused exclusively on the 
potential for contract manipulation and ignored underlying dynamics in 
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the bitcoin spot market.  Had they broadened their review to include the 
spot market, they would have identified a market ripe with fraud and ma-
nipulation, and perhaps recognized that it is naïve to think a futures con-
tract based on an asset that is prone to manipulation can itself be resistant 
to manipulation.  
The CFTC also ignored the systemic risk implications of allow-
ing bitcoin futures to come to market.  Prior to bitcoin futures, virtual 
currency was largely owned and traded outside the regulated financial 
sector, and the risks it posed to the rest of the financial system were min-
imal.  The launch of bitcoin futures enmeshed systemically important fi-
nancial institutions, including broker-dealers, central clearinghouses, and 
futures exchanges, in a volatile and little understood asset class. 
By not halting the self-certifications, the CFTC placed the regu-
latory imprimatur on an asset class that, at the time, was in the midst of a 
speculative frenzy and whose true value remains questionable.  In so do-
ing, the CFTC contributed to a rapid integration of virtual currency with 
mainstream financial markets and institutions.  In August 2018, Intercon-
tinental Exchange announced that it is forming a new company called 
Bakkt, whose aim is to clear the way for major money managers to offer 
bitcoin mutual funds, pension funds, and ETFs as regulated invest-
ments.227  In October 2018, Fidelity also announced the launch of a virtual 
currency company to provide enterprise-grade custody solutions, a virtual 
currency trading execution platform and institutional advising services.228  
While these initiatives may have happened regardless, the introduction of 
bitcoin futures almost certainly played a role in accelerating their devel-
opment. 
The CFTC has defended their actions by noting that Congress 
promulgated the self-certification process and that unless it is changed, 
“the staff of the CFTC must work responsibly within the self-certification 
structure.”229  Such protestations ignore the significant discretion the 
CFTC maintains when approving new products, as evidenced by the fact 
that the CFTC “held rigorous discussions with CME over the course of 
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six weeks”230 and “CFE over the course of four months.”231  According 
to the CFTC, these discussions resulted in “significant enhancements to 
contract design and settlement” at “the request of Commission staff.”232  
The bottom line is that the CFTC could have halted the self-certifications 
had they wanted to. 
The experience with bitcoin futures demonstrates the inherent 
weaknesses of the self-certification process in launching novel and com-
plex financial products.  Self-certification allows exchanges—who have 
a financial incentive to list new products, regardless of how risky they 
may be—to quickly list complex commodity derivatives with no public 
or market input, and minimal regulatory review.233  
Several scholars have proposed reforms to the new product ap-
proval process.234  Saule Omarova advocates for a product approval pro-
cess akin to what currently exists in the pharmaceutical industry in the 
U.S.235  The purpose of such a system is to ensure that “financial innova-
tion and the creation of complex financial instruments actually advance 
productive economic enterprise and offer real public benefits.”236  Oma-
rova’s process consists of a three-prong test that financial institutions 
seeking to market a new complex financial product must meet:  
(1) an “economic purpose” test, which would place the 
burden of proving the social and commercial utility of 
each proposed financial instrument on the financial insti-
tutions seeking its approval; (2) an “institutional capac-
ity” test, which would require a review of the applicant 
firm’s ability to effectively manage the risks and monitor 
the market dynamics of the proposed product; and (3) a 
broad “systemic effects” test, which would require a find-
ing that approval of the proposed product would not pose 
an unacceptable risk of increasing systemic vulnerability 
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and otherwise will not raise significant public policy con-
cerns.237  
 
Posner and Weyl also advocate for a new product approval sys-
tem that mirrors the approach the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) takes for new pharmaceuticals.238  Posner and Weyl’s proposal 
consists of two parts.239  First, the government would administer a test for 
determining whether a financial instrument is socially valuable or so-
cially costly, with the latter being banned.240  Then, it would require an 
FDA-like agency for financial derivatives to review and approve all new 
financial products before they enter the market.241 
Identifying, and advocating for, a revamped new product ap-
proval process is beyond the scope of this Article.  The proposals put 
forth by Posner and Weyl, and Omarova, are worthy of serious consider-
ation and an improvement over the current system.  However, reforms 
need not be so drastic. Congress could simply eliminate the self-certifi-
cation process and restore the pre-2000 product approval regime for com-
modity derivatives.  Such a regime would require the CFTC to affirma-
tively approve new derivatives products and subject the agency to greater 
scrutiny and criticism should an approved derivative later produce wide-
spread economic harm. Under these circumstances, the CFTC would be 
reticent to approve a complex new derivative that serves no economic 
purpose and contributes to systemic risk—like cash-settled bitcoin fu-
tures.  
While it’s probably too late to halt the flood of virtual currency 
derivatives, a new product approval regime based on pre-2000 principles 
could prevent future complex financial products from entering the mar-
ket.  For history tells us that, if left unchecked, needlessly complex prod-
ucts will inevitably make their way into our financial system. 
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